>Date: Wed, 17 Jan 1996 16:15:45 -0800 >From: mcpherso (John McPherson) >To: libprofs >Subject: The Statist Premise In thinking about the "Libertarian Premise" and the various versions of it in existence, it occurred to me that perhaps we can profit from a statement of its opposite: what I'll call the "Statist Premise". I realize that this idea almost surely isn't original with me, but since I haven't heard it yet, here goes: The Statist Premise "You don't own your life, the State does, and it may regulate or limit any area of it, and may even terminate it, if necessary. Period." So, what do you think? :-) -- John McPherson (mcpherso@lumina.ucsd.edu) * Host, Professors of Liberty Email Network (to post, send email to "libprofs@lumina.ucsd.edu" for admin functions, to "libprofs-request@lumina.ucsd.edu") * ftp://lumina.ucsd.edu/pub/.../libuniv_dir/libprofs.html ====================================================================== >Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 08:52:32 -0600 (CST) >From: Tibor R Machan >To: John McPherson Or, to quote Marx from "On the Jewish Question," "the human essence is the true collectivity of man." Tibor ====================================================================== >Date: Thu, 18 Jan 1996 11:18:05 -0500 >To: mcpherso (John McPherson) >From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) > The Statist Premise > > "You don't own your life, the State does, and it may regulate > or limit any area of it, and may even terminate it, if > necessary. Period." > Well, that's what it comes to, but I think it's stated a little unfairly. I suggest this one: The Statist Premise: "We can run your lives better than you can. So you should turn them over to us. [Or more precisely - since we already have them, anyway - you shouldn't complain*]." (BTW, we *strongly* recommend not trying....) __________________________________________________________________________ Jan Narveson (Professor) Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1 (519) 888-4567-1-2780# (from touch-tone); or 885-1211, ext. 2780 (via switchboard); FAX (519) 746-3097 Home: (519) 886-1673 (answering machine) e-mail: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca ====================================================================== Note: I forwarded the above statements of the premise to the following mailing lists: nonserv@math.uio.no, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, sdlp@lumina.ucsd.edu, libclubs-d@lumina.ucsd.edu. I figure the more the merrier :-) ====================================================================== >To: Tibor R Machan >Subject: Re: The Statist Premise Hi Tibor, Re: Or, to quote Marx from "On the Jewish Question," "the human essence is the true collectivity of man." Hmm ... reminds me also of Jung's "collective unconscious" and the work of social psychologist Lev Vygotsky. The collectivists have gone quite deep in their effort to redefine human nature. -- John ====================================================================== >From: m.simkin@genie.com >Date: Sun, 21 Jan 96 01:34:00 UTC 0000 >To: mcpherso >Cc: sdlp > The Statist Premise: Hmmm. Interesting concept. How's this (to be blended with others' suggestions, of course): All that you have, from your ability to move about and your ability to produce income, to your house, your health, and your life itself, are on loan to you from the State, and may be controlled or taken back to benefit those more powerful than you. ====================================================================== >From: "Eric S. Raymond" >To: mcpherso (John McPherson) >Date: Sun, 21 Jan 1996 21:47:50 -0500 (EST) >Cc: nonserv@math.uio.no, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, sdlp, libclubs-d > So, what do you all think? :-) Feel free to come up with alternative > versions of your own ... A subtler version of the moral rationalization for statism is this, what I call "The Pressure Principle": "From `A is ethically or morally obligated to do B' one may deduce `It is ethical for me to coerce A into doing B'". Once one recognizes that this equivalence is bogus, the whole rotten edifice of statist rationalization collapses. -- >>esr>> ====================================================================== >Date: 22 Jan 96 00:29:58 EST >From: "DAN G. LITWIN" <71213.1421@compuserve.com> >To: San Diego Libertarians >Subject: statists The statist pledge: I hereby certify that I DO believe in AND advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political AND social goals! ====================================================================== >Date: Mon, 22 Jan 96 10:07:25 PST >From: pinney@manta.nosc.mil (Mel M Pinney) >To: ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp >Cc: libclubs-d > So, what do you all think? :-) Feel free to come up with alternative > versions of your own ... Obviously not my own, but there's the classic: From those most able to those most in need . . . [Paraphrased from the Communist Manifesto] Mel (pinney@nosc.mil) ====================================================================== >Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 20:13:40 +0000 (GMT) >From: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" >To: Mel M Pinney >cc: ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks Dear readers, John Mcpherson set an amusing challenge of describing the statist principle: > So, what do you all think? :-) Feel free to come up with alternative > versions of your own ... Perhaps we can do no better than to copy John Stuart Mill's famous harm principle (paraphrased): "An individual is free to do anything that he wants so long as these actions do not harm or threaten to harm the well-being of others." I particularly like Mill's Harm Principle, expressed in ON LIBERTY, for it manages to be at once both a seeming restatement of libertarian principles (especially the non-aggression axiom) whilst in actual fact being a most insiduous rejection of, and assault upon, those principles. Thus, whilst most will find in Mill the proscription on the use of force, or its threat, there is a not inconsiderable number (myself included) who see Mill's Harm Principle in its true light: as a conduit by which to expand the State's control over the individual. For, by leaving it open as to how a 'harm' should be calculated (and by whom) we find an ideal vehicle by which to insinuate the culture of busy-bodyism into a free society. My hitting you might be considered as the infliction of harm, but my reading on JS Mill's ON LIBERTY might also upset and 'harm' your mental well-being --- or my belief (after Mencken) that someone, somewhere, might possibly be reading it (this disgusting literature ---- I'm not even going to mention the unspeakable 'filth' of Rothbard or Rand in this connection!) serves to justify, after Mill, the creation of a huge coercive state to enforce decency in reading (something similar is described in Bradbury's FAHRENHEIT 451) with book-burning, police raid, informer networks, executions etc. Furthermore, someone's actual existence might give grounds for rendering them as transgressors of the mighty HARM PRINCIPLE --- a principle that, if adhered to would outlaw the very existence of society and make man himself a continuous violator of the supposed moral law that it embodies. Indeed, to conclude, the HARM PRINCIPLE is aptly titled; it clearly names what will arise from its implementation: HARM. Laissez-faire, Barry. ========================================================================= >From: Fred Foldvary >Subject: Re: The "harm" principle >To: libprofs >Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 20:20:40 -0500 (EST) > >From: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" > Perhaps we can do no better than to copy John Stuart Mill's famous harm > principle (paraphrased): > > "An individual is free to do anything that he wants so long as these > actions do not harm or threaten to harm the well-being of others." > > Thus, whilst most will find in Mill the proscription on the use of force, > or its threat, there is a not inconsiderable number (myself included) who > see Mill's Harm Principle in its true light: as a conduit by which to > expand the State's control over the individual. > > For, by leaving it open as to how a 'harm' should be calculated (and by > whom) we find an ideal vehicle by which to insinuate the culture of > busy-bodyism into a free society. My hitting you might be considered as > the infliction of harm, but my reading on JS Mill's ON LIBERTY might also > upset and 'harm' your mental well-being --- > > Indeed, to conclude, the HARM PRINCIPLE is aptly titled; it clearly names > what will arise from its implementation: HARM. > Fred Foldvary replies: First of all, the rest of Mill's essay "On Liberty" clarifies and explains this "harm" principle, making it clear that Mill did not mean it to restrict free expression. Indeed, in the second chapter, Mill provides several utilitrarian reasons and justifications for free expression. But it is inded a flaw of Mill's essay that he did not provide a clear and distinct definition of "harm". I discuss this flaw of Mill's in my book *The Soul of Liberty*, and provide this definition of "harm," in which a "harm" is differentiated from an "offense": A harm is a direct, actual injury independent of personal ethical views. In contrast, an offense is entirely dependent on one's personal views. A harm involves an invasion into the domain of others, while an offense is non-invasive. Hence, the harm principle is soundly libertarian when harm is defined as a direct, actual invasion not dependent on personal views. Indeed, we canot define liberty without it. Liberty exists when law prohibits harm and only harm, with no restrictions on offenses. Fred Foldvary ========================================================================= >From: davisd@taipei.ee.washington.edu >To: "Eric S. Raymond" >Cc: mcpherso (John McPherson), nonserv@math.uio.no, libernet@dartmouth.edu, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, sdlp, libclubs-d >Date: Mon, 22 Jan 96 15:30:59 -0800 > From: "Eric S. Raymond" > > A subtler version of the moral rationalization for statism is this, what I > call "The Pressure Principle": > > "From `A is ethically or morally obligated to do B' one > may deduce `It is ethical for me to coerce A into doing B'". The argument usually runs, "If A should do B, the state should require A to do B." Once you introduce yourself into the scenario, you've taken out the unique bit of magic which makes up statism: that strange alien entity known as the state. As Max would say, isn't one fundamental requirement of a religious servitude, of the "Higher", the alienness of the "Higher"? You are not quite so alien as the State. I've come to consider your principle the totalitarian principle, at least when the State is replaced with "we". I have a recollection of Marx saying that the private/public distinction was just a bourgeois usurpation. Once "we" know what is right, it is insolence to declare a private right to act contrarily. I believe this was some tirade against the inherent egoism of classical liberalism. Does anyone know precisely where I might have got that from? Buy Buy -- Dan Davis, Ph.D. ========================================================================= >From: REBissell@aol.com >Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 18:52:47 -0500 >To: libprofs I liked the various versions of the Statist Premise you recently Listed. Here's one paraphrasing Ayn Rand (~Objectivist Newsletter~, Aug. 1962): ...[your] life and work belong to the state...and...the state may dispose of [you] in any way it pleases for the sake of whatever it deems to be its own tribal, collective good. ========================================================================= >From: akors@sas.upenn.edu (Alan Kors) >To: REBissell@aol.com >Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 20:08:51 -0500 (EST) >Cc: libprofs The statist premise (though applicable to other coercions also): "You do not own yourself, and you may not engage without our permission in so-called voluntary agreements with other so-called individuals." I suspect that the first clause itself would suffice as the essential statist premise: "You do not own yourself." Cheers, ACK ========================================================================= >From: foosi@global.california.com >Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 18:50:12 -0800 (PST) >To: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" >cc: Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks Greetings, all. On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. Mike ========================================================================= >From: m.simkin@genie.com >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 96 03:31:00 UTC 0000 >To: b.macleod-cullinane@politics.hull.ac.uk >Cc: 62036211@mmu.ac.uk, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libclubs-d, libernet-d@dartmouth.edu, mcpherso, nickd@walden.u-net.com, nonserv@math.uio.no, pinney@manta.nosc.mil, pm102@mailer.york.ac.uk, sdlp In our search for the Statist premise let's not overlook the concise: Might makes right! And how's this for a complete opposite of the Libertarian premise: I SUPPORT the use of force, except for self defense. ========================================================================= >Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 23:15:55 -0500 (EST) >From: David Ondrejko >To: foosi@global.california.com >cc: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks On Tue, 23 Jan 1996 foosi@global.california.com wrote: > Greetings, all. Greetings yourself. > On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, > the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of > another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. I quite disagree. Or, rather, I *think* I disagree since I don't know how you're using the word "liberty." If you associate it with such fictions as "rights" and "morals" then I think you have a poor understanding of the Union of Egoists. I might rephrase it along these lines: "My ability to do what I want to do (my 'liberty') ends where your ability to do what you want to do conflicts with and is stronger than mine." If that's what you meant by that phrase, I apologize; but somehow I don't think it is. It's a great life here in Heaven | vondraco@nauticom.net It's better than the bible said | http://www.nauticom.net/users/vondraco It's a great life here in Heaven |_______________________________________ It's a great life where you're dead. - Bill Morrisey, "Letter from Heaven" ========================================================================= >From: "Aeon Skoble" >To: akors@sas.upenn.edu (Alan Kors), libprofs >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 08:35:29 CST6CDT > I suspect that the first clause itself would suffice as the essential > statist premise: "You do not own yourself." Hmm... Yes, that pretty well sums it up. We might well characterize the fundamental disgreement as being simply this. Some say you own yourself, you belong to yourself. Others would say that you are in a fundamental way the property of others - the king, the community, the tribe, the state, the village (Hilary?), God. If you don't start by insisting on a conception of self-ownership, however that gets interpreted, you'll end up talked into some statist scheme. Not that I want to stop the flow of suggestions - this has been both entertaining and helpful. If no one minds, I may use some of these in class (next time I teach political phil). ========================================================================= >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 16:30:49 +0100 >To: mcpherso >From: solan@math.uio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) >Cc: ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d A fruitful question, this one concerning what the statist premise is. The liberty-minded have often tried to further their case by claiming they "have rights", and thus that these entities "rights" somehow "exist". This invariably leaves the liberty-minded with an impossible task, namely to prove the existence and meaningfulness of these abstractions. And when the liberty-minded fails this task, as he will unless he is a clever word-trickster, the opponent will conclude that liberty is a lost case. Rather than doing this, the liberty-minded could do like McPherson has done posing this question. In what way does the State assert its case? - its claim to a right? By working on a polemic against "state rights", a far better case can be made - and a far more honest one. Svein Olav ========================================================================= >Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 09:29:12 -0800 (PST) >From: "Jack B. Nimble" >Subject: The Statist Premise >To: libernet-d@dartvax.dartmouth.edu [If you want further reply from me, please copy to jbnimble@netcom.com, as I no longer subscribe to libernet-d.] On Mon, 22 Jan 1996 davisd@taipei.ee.washington.edu wrote: > The argument usually runs, "If A should do B, the state should > require A to do B." Once you introduce yourself into the scenario, > you've taken out the unique bit of magic which makes up statism: that > strange alien entity known as the state. As Max would say, isn't one > fundamental requirement of a religious servitude, of the "Higher", the > alienness of the "Higher"? You are not quite so alien as the State. > Since it is not possible to supply a satisfactory *objective* definition to "should", I have concluded that a statement such as "A should do x" means one of the following: 1. It is my view that A should do x. 2. The majority of people in the (neighborhood, city, state, country, world -- pick one) hold the view that A should do x. 3. The people who are running the government hold the view that A should do x. With this understanding, any implementation of "if A should do x, then the state should force A to do x is a clear violation of fundamental libertarian principle. The more interesting question is the converse proposition, i.e., if A should not do x, then the state should prevent A from doing x. Minarchists would hold that there are some values of x for which the above proposition is true, namely those actions x which aggress against the life, liberty, or property of others. Others have claimed that actions x which do harm to others are also included, but, as I have stated on previous occasions, "doing harm" is too broad a criterion to use. An example would be x = "A opening up a competitive enterprise which causes B's customers to leave in droves." Here, A's action x does in fact do harm to B, but libertarians must hold that the state is unjustified in preventing A from doing x, because x does not aggress against anybody's life, liberty, or property. Jack B. Nimble ========================================================================= >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 23:21:46 +0000 (GMT) >From: "P. Marks" >To: m.simkin@genie.com >cc: b.macleod-cullinane@politics.hull.ac.uk, 62036211@mmu.ac.uk, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libclubs-d, libernet-d@dartmouth.edu, mcpherso, nickd@walden.u-net.com, nonserv@math.uio.no, pinney@manta.nosc.mil, sdlp On Wed, 24 Jan 1996 m.simkin@genie.com wrote: > In our search for the Statist premise let's not overlook the concise: > > Might makes right! > > And how's this for a complete opposite of the Libertarian premise: > > I SUPPORT the use of force, except for self defense. > > In practice that is what of the statists PRACTICE (what their policies lead to) but I doubt many of them actually BELIEVE that. Paul Marks. ========================================================================= >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 23:20:23 +0000 (GMT) >From: "P. Marks" >To: foosi@global.california.com >cc: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks On Tue, 23 Jan 1996 foosi@global.california.com wrote: > Greetings, all. > > On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, > the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of > another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. > > Mike > "Of all places" is quite right. The French Revolution was a disaster for liberty. Paul. ========================================================================= >From: foosi@global.california.com >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 18:44:51 -0800 (PST) >To: "P. Marks" >cc: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks On Wed, 24 Jan 1996, P. Marks wrote: > On Tue, 23 Jan 1996 foosi@global.california.com wrote: > > On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, > > the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of > > another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. > "Of all places" is quite right. > > The French Revolution was a disaster for liberty. I do think everyone on the list is well-aware of that. The source of the formula in no way detracts from its interest or ingenuity. ========================================================================= >From: foosi@global.california.com >Date: Wed, 24 Jan 1996 22:25:18 -0800 (PST) >To: David Ondrejko >cc: "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis , Paul Marks On Tue, 23 Jan 1996, David Ondrejko wrote: > I quite disagree. Or, rather, I *think* I disagree since I don't know > how you're using the word "liberty." Neither do I. Good at using, bad at defining. It's more of a physical and metaphysical thing - a 'free zone' around each person in space and time. > If you associate it with such fictions as "rights" and "morals" then I > think you have a poor understanding of the Union of Egoists. Max Stirner has nothingto say to me if I have truck with rights and morals so long as I own them and am not owned by them. If they come out of my own power, then his critique holds no - force. > "My ability to do what I want to do (my 'liberty') It's all too easy for Stirner to be interpreted as an exponent of simple voluntarism or simple rule of force. Remember: for him it is fundamentally inner. > ends where your ability to do what you want to do > conflicts with and is stronger than mine." That's not much of a Union. The whole beauty of the concept is that it aroises out of individual strength. Strengths need not necessarily be in collision. If I am not owned by spooks, if I own I and all that is mine, I have most of what I actually need. ========================================================================= >From: TaxCenter@aol.com >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 02:26:54 -0500 >To: m.simkin@genie.com, b.macleod-cullinane@politics.hull.ac.uk >cc: 62036211@mmu.ac.uk, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libclubs-d, libernet-d@dartmouth.edu, mcpherso, nickd@walden.u-net.com, nonserv@math.uio.no, pinney@manta.nosc.mil, pm102@mailer.york.ac.uk, sdlp Might does not make right. It only makes legal. ========================================================================= >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 11:20:15 +0100 >To: "P. Marks" >From: solan@math.uio.no (Svein O. G. Nyberg) >Cc: m.simkin@genie.com, b.macleod-cullinane@politics.hull.ac.uk, 62036211@mmu.ac.uk, ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libclubs-d, libernet-d@dartmouth.edu, mcpherso, nickd@walden.u-net.com, pinney@manta.nosc.mil, sdlp >> In our search for the Statist premise let's not overlook the concise: >> >> Might makes right! >> >> And how's this for a complete opposite of the Libertarian premise: >> >> I SUPPORT the use of force, except for self defense. > >In practice that is what of the statists PRACTICE (what their policies >lead to) but I doubt many of them actually BELIEVE that. Often "Might makes Right" is interpreted as _individual_ might makes _individual_ right. Socrates was confronted with this view by [????? Thrasymachos?] in "the Republic", and replied with asking T[?] what he would then have to say against a collective version of same principle, i.e. the individually weak banding against the individually strong, over- powering them by their numbers. Svein Olav ========================================================================= >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 07:37:11 -0600 (CST) >From: "Thomas L. Knapp" >To: foosi@global.california.com >cc: "P. Marks" , "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis On Wed, 24 Jan 1996 foosi@global.california.com wrote: > > > On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, > > > the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of > > > another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. > > > "Of all places" is quite right. > > > > The French Revolution was a disaster for liberty. > > I do think everyone on the list is well-aware of that. The source of the > formula in no way detracts from its interest or ingenuity. Indeed it doesn't. The failure of the French Revolution was that the formula was seen more in the breach than in the observance. The ascent of the tribunals and the sweeping powers of denunciation, kangaroo court, and execution made it clear that the "leaders" wished to extend their liberty far past the point where that of others began. Without being maudlin or implying that the United States is not equally afflicted by statism, I will note that the initial success of the United States in avoiding a like terror was due in large part to having a frontier where the citizens could exercise their liberty without having a large state presence nearby. Tom ========================================================================= >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 09:07:56 -0500 >To: mcpherso (John McPherson) >From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) I too noted this post >> From: "Eric S. Raymond" >> >> A subtler version of the moral rationalization for statism is this, what I >> call "The Pressure Principle": >> >> "From `A is ethically or morally obligated to do B' one >> may deduce `It is ethical for me to coerce A into doing B'". We are morally obligated not to murder people. It is certainly right to use coercion to prevent people from murdering people, and perhaps to punish them for doing soif they do it. We are morally obligated not to steal. The owner may certainly use force to see to it that I do not, or to exact compensation if I do. More generally, force may be used to repel aggressors. And all of these sentences are moral sentences. They all contain the notion of moral duty or obligation. (There are some contributors to libernet who seem to think that isn't so, and that these are "legal" notions. But you can't sensibly say that unless you have a notion of law other than legislated law. And a notion of law other than legislated law (or, more generally, rules formulated by persons purportint to be the leaders of the group over whom those rules are to be operative) are precisely what is meant by 'moral law'. It is well to have a distinction between one branch of norms, those purporting to be general rules for all, and which is most nearly associated, I think, with the term 'morality', in its most familiar use, and on the other hand things like personal ethics - ideals of life, personally adopted regimes of conduct, and that sort of thing. Too many people - such as the Objectivists, as I have been learning - seem to think that morality just is, or is a straight deduction from, principles in this broader arena. But that leaves liberty out in the cold. Clearly what we want is a social rule permitting each individual to live by his own ideals of life, as nearly as possible. Those who follow some particular religion, say, or who devote their lives to physical activity, or whatever, should certainly NOT be making those preferences into rules for all. But the proibition on killing people just because it happens to serve your personal interests to do so IS a rule for all, and is an enforceable rule. (Having it a nonenforceable rule is close enough to sheer nonsense that we may as well call it that.) Raymond's idea must surely be that that coercion is not justified merely from 'shoulds'. But clearly what we need is to sort out those shoulds for which a legitimization of coercion is OK from those for which it is not. Following John Stuart Mill (more or less), I suggest that we relegate the notion of justice for this purpose. Those actions which are required by justice are, by definition, the ones such that enforcement by forcible coercion is in order; those not so required are ones in which it is not. By the way, justice is not the whole area of rules for groups. We should indeed be kind, charitable, helpful, courteous, and devoted to the good of our fellows. But those are nonenforceable by coercion. We may not (contrary to what all governments currently do) rob our fellows at gunpoint in order to support charitable causes. But nevertheless, it is a good rule for every individual to be disposed toward charity, and in particular, to approve of charitable acts when one encounters them. Notice that this last paragraph itself expresses what can be argued to be a principle of justice. Interference with actions which are not themselves interferences with anybody are unjust - that is, contrary to a rule that may be enforced, coercively if need be. Far more important is this: from the fact that something may legitimately be enforced by the use of force, it does not follow that the State is the one to do the enforcing. It is an important question whether statist enforcement of anything is ever justified, insofar as that can be distinguished from, simply, enforcement. In fact, enforcement should be by the aggrieved party and his agents. The State is an omnibus enforcer, and that's a large part of the trouble. It enforces on behalf of all, whether they want it or not. Liberty has largely fallen through that crack. __________________________________________________________________________ Jan Narveson (Professor) Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1 (519) 888-4567-1-2780# (from touch-tone); or 885-1211, ext. 2780 (via switchboard); FAX (519) 746-3097 Home: (519) 886-1673 (answering machine) e-mail: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca ========================================================================= >From: foosi@global.california.com >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 08:07:39 -0800 (PST) >To: "Thomas L. Knapp" >cc: "P. Marks" , "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis On Thu, 25 Jan 1996, Thomas L. Knapp wrote: > The failure of the French Revolution was that the formula > was seen more in the breach than in the observance. Very true - just as they rechristened Notre Dame de Paris as "the Church of Reason." This alone shows how little they really respected reason - or liberty. ========================================================================= >From: davisd@taipei.ee.washington.edu >To: "Thomas L. Knapp" >Cc: foosi@global.california.com, "P. Marks" , "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@dartmouth.edu, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis On the French revolution, I recall being told that one of the major problems was that many of the revolutionary leaders refused to take power once the revolution was won (some kind of ideological purity thing), so that others filled the vacuum. Does that sound familiar to anyone? Buy Buy -- Dan Davis, Ph.D. email: davisd@pierce.ee.washington.edu www: http://pierce.ee.washington.edu/~davisd/personal.html Egoist Archive: http://pierce.ee.washington.edu/~davisd/egoist/ ========================================================================= >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 22:20:10 +0000 (GMT) >From: "P. Marks" >To: "Thomas L. Knapp" >cc: foosi@global.california.com, "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis On Thu, 25 Jan 1996, Thomas L. Knapp wrote: > On Wed, 24 Jan 1996 foosi@global.california.com wrote: > > > > > On this subject, I rather enjoy the formula used during, of all places, > > > > the French Revolution: "The liberty of one citizen ends where that of > > > > another begins." This describes the Union of Egoists rather well. > > > > > "Of all places" is quite right. > > > > > > The French Revolution was a disaster for liberty. > > > > I do think everyone on the list is well-aware of that. The source of the > > formula in no way detracts from its interest or ingenuity. > > Indeed it doesn't. The failure of the French Revolution was that the formula > was seen more in the breach than in the observance. The ascent of the > tribunals and the sweeping powers of denunciation, kangaroo court, and > execution made it clear that the "leaders" wished to extend their liberty > far past the point where that of others began. > > Without being maudlin or implying that the United States is not equally > afflicted by statism, I will note that the initial success of the United > States in avoiding a like terror was due in large part to having a frontier > where the citizens could exercise their liberty without having a large > state presence nearby. > > Tom I do not think that the Frontier was the key factor. In the United States the revolution was about protecting property rights (from the threat of arbitrary British rule) and the federal government was strictly limited. True it was not as limited as many people (such as me) would have wished and the limits have mostly collapsed these days - but that does not alter the fact that it was limited. In France the revolution was more about the "rule of the people" (the "rights of man", not just the rights of individual persons). Hardly any of the revolutionaries objected to (for example) the Roman Catholic church being first robbed and then taken over by the government (remember there were far more people in France than in the United States at the time - yet I doubt a formal federal [central] government controlled church would have been received well). Nor did many revolutionaries object to the government issuing fiat money in the name of "the people" - with the threat of death to any individual person who refused to accept it. The American revolution was about respect for traditional rights which it was believed the British government threatened. The French was about creating a new society were all things of the past (the months of the year, the days of the week, the systems of measurement) would not evolve through time and civil interaction, but would be "rationally planned" from above. Even the ancient provinces of France were abolished - how would Americans have felt about the abolition of the 13 original States? It is sometimes supposed that men like Edmund Burke opposed the French Revolution out of blind faith in tradition. Men like Burke were tradtitionalists, but there is a lot of rational argument in works like "Reflections on the Revolution in France" (1790) I would estimate that about three quarters of the book is about opposing French fiat money and other violations of property rights (in one's possessions and one's own body). In short in opposing theft and murder. Paul Marks. ========================================================================= >Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 16:48:35 -0600 (CST) >From: "Thomas L. Knapp" >To: "P. Marks" >cc: foosi@global.california.com, "B.MACLEOD-CULLINANE" , Mel M Pinney , ca-liberty@shell.portal.com, libernet@Dartmouth.EDU, mcpherso, nonserv@math.uio.no, sdlp, libclubs-d, Howard the Dolphin <62036211@mmu.ac.uk>, Nick Davis On Thu, 25 Jan 1996, P. Marks wrote: > On Thu, 25 Jan 1996, Thomas L. Knapp wrote: > > Without being maudlin or implying that the United States is not equally > > afflicted by statism, I will note that the initial success of the United > > States in avoiding a like terror was due in large part to having a frontier > > where the citizens could exercise their liberty without having a large > > state presence nearby. > > > I do not think that the Frontier was the key factor. Your remarks are, of course, pertinent and seem to be fairly accurate. I will, however, stand by my statement to a certain extent. The frontier may not have been "the key factor," but it was a factor nonetheless. The size and remote nature of the continent assured two things in the American case: once the Revolution was over, there was no immediate need for paranoia from "encirclement" by states bent on destroying the gains of the revolution, and there was ample room for would-be dissidents to flee the immediate presence of state power. Hence, we had a Whiskey rebellion and a Shay's rebellion (which were responded to forcefully), but not a Terror. Tom ========================================================================= >Date: Fri, 26 Jan 1996 08:33:12 -0600 (CST) >From: Tibor R Machan >To: John McPherson John: It would be nice to have a list of statist premises FROM statists! This would be very useful to have on hand - with citations, etc. Best, Tibor =========================================================================