Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 07:53:46 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary To: Liberty Professors Subject: equality of persons vs. lesser beings Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately kill a non-person animal? Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 11:14:03 -0500 From: holcombe@coss.fsu.edu (Randall Holcombe) >Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to >murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately >kill a non-person animal? One reason is that we can reason with people to develop social rules that protect our right to life in exchange for our observing the right to life for others. We understand from experience how this works, which gives everybody a disincentive to kill other people. Animals are not so perceptive. (Cows do not organize against farmers because they anticipate their fates as hamburger.) The "evil" part of it is that we want to make the social costs of violating the rights of others higher, so try to impose moral as well as legal sanctions. I make an argument along these lines in my book, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT. Of course, this does not rule out other arguments, but one reason I like this one is that the explanation is purely positive. Rights are the result of an exchange, and animals don't have them because they don't participate in exchanges. Randy Holcombe ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 08:31:35 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Wed, 27 Nov 1996, Randall Holcombe wrote, responding to my Q: > >Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to > >murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately > >kill a non-person animal? > > One reason is that we can reason with people to develop social rules that > protect our right to life in exchange for our observing the right to life > for others. We understand from experience how this works, which gives > everybody a disincentive to kill other people. Animals are not so > perceptive. (Cows do not organize against farmers because they anticipate > their fates as hamburger.) This, Randy, is indeed a practical reason for avoiding murder, but is it a moral reason? > The "evil" part of it is that we want to make the social costs of violating > the rights of others higher, so try to impose moral as well as > legal sanctions. What does "moral" mean in that context? By "imposing" moral sanctions, does this imply creating a myth that murder is immoral, thus creating guilt as an inhibitor? This would still not be a genuine moral argument. It's like creating the concept of a punishing god as a disincentive; this does not demonstrate the existence of such a god. > I make an argument along these lines in my book, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF > GOVERNMENT. Of course, this does not rule out other arguments, but one > reason I like this one is that the explanation is purely positive. Rights > are the result of an exchange, and animals don't have them because they > don't participate in exchanges. > Randy Holcombe Such positive arguments are indeed a good practical reason to make such agreements, but they are not arguments regarding inherent moral good and evil. If a thief demands either my money or my life, as a practical matter I may agree to hand over my money, but this does not make the exchange (my money for his avoiding killing me) morally right. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 16:38:32 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" Fred Foldvary wrote: >Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to >murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately >kill a non-person animal? "It is evil to murder a rational being."? But do we have to subscribe to a theory which has a class "evil" in order to have libertarianism? Is libertarianism dependent on a moral theory? Sure, if we are to have some universal and fact-proof libertarian theory, we will have to have recourse to some moral fiction with terms like "evil" to make us feel good. What is your own reason for being libertarian? Svein Olav ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 11:57:06 +0000 > Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to > murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately > kill a non-person animal? Well, I wouldn't put it that way to begin with. You're thinking of a syllogism like: 1. It is evil to kill a human 2. But, [some supressed premise which you are inquiring about now] 3. Therefore, it is _not_ evil to kill a non-human animal. But I don't think the permissibility of killing non-humans has anything to do with the morality of killing humans. Morality is a human-oriented concept. Moral rules are meant to govern human interaction. That includes concepts like "rights," but also treatment of others in general - other poeple, that is. Non-humans just aren't the subject of moral discourse. We might well come up with some argument that deliberately inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals is a sign of a character flaw, and that would be a reason not to do _that_, but that's not the same as saying they have rights. Since they don't have a right not to be killed, it's permissible to kill them. That's one way to go. The other way to go is biological: If it's permissible for a lion to kill a deer to eat it, why shouldn't I do the same? Some other animals' function is to be eaten. Dogs eveolved to help us herd and to protect and alert us, but modern livestock animals have evolved as livestock. That's what they're for. Happy thanksgiving everyone! Gobble, gobble! ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 10:10:37 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Wed, 27 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > But do we have to subscribe to a theory which has a class > "evil" in order to have libertarianism? Is libertarianism > dependent on a moral theory? There are "pragmatic" libertarians who think they can do without ethics, but in reading that literature, it seems to me they sneak ethics in thru the back door. > Sure, if we are to have some > universal and fact-proof libertarian theory, we will have > to have recourse to some moral fiction with terms like > "evil" to make us feel good. It's not clear to me what "fact-proof" means. A moral theory can be in accord with facts. > What is your own reason for being libertarian? I've been a libertarian since my teenage years, and don't recall not being a libertarian. I think the reason is that I always resented being told what to do, and I have no awe of any authority. I'm also a tolerant soul who wishes to live and let live. But that's personal. My philosophical reason for being a liberatarian is that there is a universal non-arbitrary ethic whose rules constitute one type of libertarianism. My book presenting this proposition is called "The Soul of Liberty." Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 10:23:03 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Wed, 27 Nov 1996, Aeon Skoble wrote: > > Can someone point to an argument as to why if it is evil to > > murder a person, it is not evil or as evil to deliberately > > kill a non-person animal? > > Morality is a human-oriented concept. Moral rules are meant to > govern human interaction. I agree that human beings are moral agents because of their nature as beings making reasoned choices, while (by premise here) other animals are not agents committing moral acts. But that by itself does not imply that morality has no rules concerning the treatment by human beings of other animals. Is this an arbitrary premise that morality is only a human-oriented concept? I don't accept it without further argument. > That's one way to go. The other way to > go is biological: If it's permissible for a lion to kill a deer to > eat it, why shouldn't I do the same? Because human beings are moral agents and lions are not. > Happy thanksgiving everyone! Gobble, gobble! I'm not claiming we have no right to kill and eat animals. I'm just inquiring as to why we would have such a right, if morality exists at all. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 14:44:48 +0000 > Is this an arbitrary premise that morality is only a human-oriented > concept? Well, there are two possibilities: God exists or he doesn't. If God exists, then it is ok for humans to kill animals, especially for food, because God said so. But if God doesn't exist, then morality is a human construct even if derived (as I think it is) from objective realities about the universe. In other words, morals are a human thing, even rational objective universal moral rules. Now the general presumption against killing people comes from a more general notion of human rights, which there's no reason to think animals share. Animals don't even think that! :-) > Because human beings are moral agents and lions are not. Exactly my point. Non-humans aren't moral agents, so human moral guidelines don't cover them, at least not in the same way they cover each of us. > I'm not claiming we have no right to kill and eat animals. > I'm just inquiring as to why we would have such a right, if > morality exists at all. I'm suggesting we think about it differently: it's not that I have a right to eat them, it's that they _don't_ have a right _not_ to be eaten by me, or by any other creature. That's the way nature works. Best, Aeon ====================================================================== Date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 13:27:50 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary Aeon Skoble wrote: > ... But if God doesn't exist, then morality > is a human construct even if derived (as I think it is) from > objective realities about the universe. > In other words, morals are a human thing, even > rational objective universal moral rules. Yes, morals are a human thing, since it deals with humans, but I don't understand how a conclusion derived from objective premises can be considered a "construct" unless you are using the term so broadly that all knowledge, e.g. economics, is a construct. Is universal morality a construct the way a computer programming language is an invented thing? > Now the general > presumption against killing people comes from a more general notion > of human rights, which there's no reason to think animals share. > Animals don't even think that! :-) Why no reason? > > Because human beings are moral agents and lions are not. > > Exactly my point. Non-humans aren't moral agents, so human moral > guidelines don't cover them, at least not in the same way they cover > each of us. But being a moral agent means that one's actions are subject to moral judgment, not that one may do anything to non-moral agents. I agree that moral guidlines may be different for acts to non-persons, but the question remains, why? Fred F. ====================================================================== Date: 28 Nov 1996 02:40:47 -0500 From: "Robert Sade" Reply to: RE>>equality of persons vs. lesser beings Aeon Skoble said: > Non-humans aren't moral agents, so human moral > guidelines don't cover them, at least not in the same way they cover > each of us. To which Fred Foldvary responded: *But being a moral agent means that one's actions are subject to moral judgment, not that one may do anything to non-moral agents. I agree that moral guidlines may be different for acts to non-persons, but the question remains, why?* I think that Aeon has already answered Fred's pointed question, but perhaps saying it another way may help to clarify it. In nature, the aim of every living thing (plant and animal) is to remain alive. To do so, they must pursue certain courses, make certain choices. Anything goes, they may act in any way at all; there is no `morality', no blame or praise. Those which pursue correct courses, make correct choices, succeed in remaining alive. The others die. Human beings are living things, and are subject to the same requirements. They must do whatever they must do, or die. Anything goes. There are no limits on what they do: gathering, hunting, farming. Like the lion, alligator, shark, paramecium, or bacterium, they can kill anything. Or be killed, if they choose the wrong prey or fail to defend themselves. Human beings are different in one critical way that distinguishes them from other animals. They can reason: they can choose between options, not by the instincts that determine the choices of other animals , but by conceptualizing the world in abstract terms, fashioning a unique fulfillment of their own lives (as only a person can), and most importantly, recognizing the capacity of other persons to do the same. This last is the basis for the notion of `rights': in order to live a HUMAN life, every person must be allowed to pursue his own idea of the best life he can live. Rights delimit the territory in which persons are free to operate without interference. The first of these rights is life: persons cannot be killed by other persons without cause (a number of disclaimers apply here). Animals do not have the capacity to reason, to choose on rational grounds, to be blamed or praised for their actions. They are not moral agents, they have no rights, they can be killed to further the lives (broadly conceived) of other living things, including human beings. The question of what human beings do to non-persons (or to non-moral agents) is not a moral question--such issues apply only to persons. There may be SOCIAL or LEGAL or other reasons not to kill animals, but not moral reasons. The situation is not as simple as I've briefly portrayed it here, because of borderline cases (the newborn infant, the end-stage Alzheimer's patient, the chimpanzee or baboon that can conceptualize [seemingly] simple ideas and communicate them) and because of sensibilities we have toward certain animals (we think nothing of setting a trap to kill rats, but are outraged by mistreatment of a pet dog). This is not the place to flesh out responses to those problems, but Fred asked why moral guidelines may be different for acts to non-persons than to persons, and this is one possible answer to that question. Happy Thanksgiving to all, with particular thanks to Fred for telling the true story of the origin of this holiday. It gave a whole new meaning to today's festivities to me and my family. --Bob ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 11:28:02 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" In response to Fred Foldvary: >> Is libertarianism dependent on a moral theory? > >There are "pragmatic" libertarians who think they can do >without ethics, but in reading that literature, it seems to >me they sneak ethics in thru the back door. That has occured to me as well. Nevertheless .. What is needed to judge between alternatives are values; if my highest value in life is government buildings, there is no way that I can be convinced libertarianism is the right choice. But does this need to imply that we must base our case on a fiction of universal values? Is it not sufficient that we can show that values we hold -personally- lead us to consider libertarianism the best choice? And for geting where we want, is it not sufficient that we can convince a sufficiently large part of the populace that with their values, libertarianism is the best choice? [Now, a side issue is the consistency of people's values. We might have to argue a case for our values to win as well, but this does not imply universality either.] >It's not clear to me what "fact-proof" means. When I talked about "fact-proof" theories, I was thinking about a theory that would state libertarianism was "right" no matter what the actual consequences, like IF libertarianism led to wide- spread poverty etc. etc., it would still deem libertarianism superior. I prefer fact-sensitive libertarian theories, one that hold libertarianism is the best choice because it best realizes the values I hold. >A moral theory can be in accord with facts. Whatever "in accord with" means .. >> What is your own reason for being libertarian? > >I think the reason is that >I always resented being told what to do, and I have no >awe of any authority. I'm also a tolerant soul who >wishes to live and let live. > >But that's personal. I must say I liked this one best. It's the more genuine of the two reasons, and in my esteem also the best base for convincing others. Often libertarianism is said to have two camps, the "rights" camp and the "utilitarian" camp. I don't think many really belong to either -genuinely- but that a third position, "value libertarian" is a better description. I am a value libertarian. Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 06:27:28 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On 28 Nov 1996, Robert Sade wrote: > Human beings are living things, and are subject to the same > requirements. They must do whatever they must do, or die. Anything goes. Anything goes physically, subject to physical restraints, but because human beings are moral agents, not-anything goes morally. > Human beings are different in one critical way that distinguishes them > from other animals. They can reason: they can choose between options, not by > the instincts that determine the choices of other animals , but by > conceptualizing the world in abstract terms, fashioning a unique fulfillment > of their own lives (as only a person can), and most importantly, recognizing > the capacity of other persons to do the same. > This last is the basis for the > notion of `rights': in order to live a HUMAN life, every person must be > allowed to pursue his own idea of the best life he can live. It's not clear what "must" means here. To fully use reason, a person needs liberty. But the need by itself does not establish a right. To live, a human being also needs food, but that does not imply that others must feed him. And if "anything goes," then why MUST persons "allow" other persons anything, even if they need it? > Animals do not have the capacity to reason, to choose on rational > grounds, to be blamed or praised for their actions. They are not moral > agents, they have no rights It does not logically follow from the premise that animals "are not moral agents" that "they have no rights." Moral agency implies that the actions of an agent are moral acts, i.e. can be judged to be morally good, evil, or neutral. The range of such judgment, i.e. the set of acts subject to such judgment, remains to be determined. In a universal ethic which is also comprehensive in acts, all acts, hence also those committed on animals, are subject to moral judgment. Fred Foldvary (who cheerfully eats turkey any time) ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 06:41:29 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > But does this need to imply that we must base our case on a > fiction of universal values? There are no universal values, because values are individually subjective. But there can be (and I believe there is) a universal ethic with universal moral rules derived from premises consistent with subjective values. > Is it not sufficient that we can > show that values we hold -personally- lead us to consider > libertarianism the best choice? Personal values sympathetic to libertarianism (e.g. tolerance) may be sufficient to lead one towards libertarianism, but these are not suffient for those holding unsympathetic values (e.g. intolerance). What is sufficent for those not holding liberty-sympathetic values is a mind receptive to new ideas and to reason. What is necessary in that case is a sound argument. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 14:53:12 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" Subject: Re: equality of persons vs. nonpersons Fred Foldvary wrote: >But the need by itself does not establish a right. Excellently put. >[B]ecause human beings are moral agents, not-anything goes morally. A friend of mine suggested that whenever a word was sufficiently loaded with emotional attachment, it should be substituted with "flub flub" for a while to make the argument more clear. So I ask, why is it that "Because humans are flub flub agents, not-anything goes flub flubbily."? Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 09:35:05 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > Fred Foldvary wrote: > >[B]ecause human beings are moral agents, not-anything goes morally. > > A friend of mine suggested that whenever a word was sufficiently > loaded with emotional attachment, it should be substituted with > "flub flub" for a while to make the argument more clear. > > So I ask, why is it that > "Because humans are flub flub agents, not-anything goes flub flubbily."? In this context, "moral" refers to the designation of a deliberate act as good, evil, or neutral. A "person" is a living being with the capacity (actual or potential) to make reasoned choices and act on those choices. Acts done by persons are "moral" in that they can be designated as good, evil, or neutral. Hence, persons are moral agents. A rock, in contrast, is not a moral agent, since it does not perform its own acts. Physical forces may result in rocks being cast which damage a person. This happening may be considered "bad" by the person, but the rock did not act, so it is not a moral bad. If an animal is considered an automaton following a genetic program and reacting as programmed to stimuli, then it is like a rock, and not deliberately acting, hence not a moral agent. So, because human beings are agents whose deliberate acts can be designated as good, evil, or neutral, it follows that not-anything goes with respect to such acts, since evil acts do not "go," i.e. are by implication not permitted. I hope this clarifies the flubbing. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 18:12:23 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" Subject: Convincing people with Universal Ethics Fred Foldvary wrote: >There are no universal values, because values are individually subjective. >But there can be (and I believe there is) a universal ethic with universal >moral rules derived from premises consistent with subjective values. This would surprise me very much. But I'm curious .. if you can agree to my cross-examining, could you give an outline? >> Is it not sufficient that we can show that values we hold -personally- >> lead us to consider libertarianism the best choice? > >Personal values sympathetic to libertarianism (e.g. tolerance) may be >sufficient to lead one towards libertarianism, but these are not suffient >for those holding unsympathetic values (e.g. intolerance). That is true. And I have also had my time of searching for the Perfect Argument, the one that was Undeniable and that would convince anyone who looked at it with an open and honest mind .. and preferrably the others as well. But this strikes ever more as just a dream of omnipotency. There is no argument that would convince Anyone Anytime. It is true that arguments from value will have a failure rate which is rather sad, especially in the current value climate. But have arguments from "universal principles" really fared better? We do undeniably have some very bright people espousing "universal" type of arguments on our side. Yet, we libertarians have not made many a dent in our actual day to day reality. The impact we have had seems more due to the success of economic arguments, and arguments about values people have come to hold .. freedom concerning drugs, freedom to settle, immigrate and so on. There is no perfect and omnipotent strategy to go to libertaria. There is us and our values, and there is the others with values that I believe can be argued with until they have consistency and that does lead to a libertarian viewpoint. We can tell them that what they value - what they want to achieve - is best served by a libertarian political system. But it's hard work, and I don't think it is true for all and everyone; only for most people. >What is sufficent for those not holding liberty-sympathetic values is a >mind receptive to new ideas and to reason. What is necessary in that case >is a sound argument. A sound argument is good to have. Many sound arguments even better. But "new ideas" and "reason" will not -as previously stated- convince the person who values government buildings above all. No argument can be totally free from a base in certain values. We just have to recognize that; we are not the Universal Benefactors with our political views. We are the benefactors of those with values like ours - which I sincerely hope is the bulk of the populace. Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 18:13:24 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" Subject: Re: equality of persons vs. nonpersons Fred Foldvary wrote: >In this context, "moral" refers to the designation of a deliberate act as >good, evil, or neutral. [...] Acts done by persons are "moral" [..] >persons are moral agents. Those were the definitions. >[E]vil acts do not "go," i.e. are by implication not permitted. > >I hope this clarifies the flubbing. I assume that's what you mean by "evil"; that *you will not permit it*. = = I might have misread you, Fred, but I got the impression that you said the difference between the permissibility of killing an animal and the impermissibility of killing a human was because the latter was one of these "moral agents". If I understood you right; why? Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 10:38:02 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Reuven Brenner wrote: > So I am back to my basic point: let us try not to have abstract discussions > on aggregates - "animals" in this case. It's enough that macroeconomists > talk like, and look at the disaster that that presumed "science" has led. > Let try to be concrete. I think there is a difference between taxonomical categories and ideal types, and aggregates. An aggregate, such as aggregate income, adds up individual components. Aggregates herd individuals to a flock. In contrast, taxonomy differentiates between meaningful types of phenomena. For example, when we distinguish between an entrepreneur and ordinary workers we do not aggregate entrepreneurs and treat the group, but deal with that category of action. So the category of "person" is a taxonomic type of living being with certain characteristics; it is not the treatment of all persons as a group. There is indeed a need to be careful with categories. For example, some writers may say "Americans are generous" thus aggregating individuals who do not share the characteristic. The category of "entrepreneur" does not have characteristics not shared by all entrepreneurs, and the category of "person" consists of qualities necessarily included in all persons. Note also that a particular human being may have characteristics of a person but may also behave in ways typical also of non-persons, e.g. jump involuntarily when a noise is heard. "Person" does not refer to the physical human being in all its manifestations but to certain characteristics. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 11:12:37 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > I might have misread you, Fred, but I got the impression that you said > the difference between the permissibility of killing an animal and the > impermissibility of killing a human was because the latter was one of > these "moral agents". If I understood you right; why? Svein, No, that is not what I meant. In fact, I argued the opposite, that just because an animal is not a moral agent does not imply that it is permissible to kill it. Moral agency means that the actor is judged, not that acts to non-agents are not judged. Indeed, my original question remains unanswered (responses so far do not solve the puzzle). That question is, if it is evil to deliberately kill a person, why is it not evil to kill a non-person? Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 15:29:26 -0500 From: Reuven Brenner >Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 12:09:04 >To: Fred Foldvary >From: Reuven Brenner >Subject: Re: equality of persons vs. nonpersons > >I am sorry to be the contrarian lately, and exploding baloons (no, no, I am not sorry at all - I like it), but I think that this discussion about people and animals is again done in the abstract. > >Morality refers, as far as I understand to a set of rights, as well as a set of OBLIGATIONS. And here is the difference: people and SOME animals comply with obligations (and I do not care what are their motives, or in philosophical discussions whether they "understand" what they are doing. Deeds are far more important than motives - as anyone who saw Schindels' List, to give a quick example, can understand). > >And indeed, most people make this distinction, may be without articulating it when killing insects, animals. Dogs, whom we know we can teach a sense of obligations toward humans, are treated differently than chickens whom we did not succeed to teach this sense. Indeed, if I recall vaguely from my readings of history, there was a time when some animals were treated as "moral" beings, and, if by accident they killed their master, they were even brought to trial (Bob Cooter or Frank may know more about this). Of course, when something gets into the legal sphere and lawyers can make money, it was brought to an extreme, bringing eventually even pigs to the court (I do not know who paid for the representation). > >So I am back to my basic point: let us try not to have abstract discussions on aggregates - "animals" in this case. It's enough that macroeconomists talk like, and look at the disaster that that presumed "science" has led. Let try to be concrete. > >Reuven Brenner > > > >At 06:41 AM 11/28/96 -0800, you wrote: >>On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: >> >>> But does this need to imply that we must base our case on a >>> fiction of universal values? >> >>There are no universal values, because values are individually subjective. >>But there can be (and I believe there is) a universal ethic with universal >>moral rules derived from premises consistent with subjective values. >> >>> Is it not sufficient that we can >>> show that values we hold -personally- lead us to consider >>> libertarianism the best choice? >> >>Personal values sympathetic to libertarianism (e.g. tolerance) may be >>sufficient to lead one towards libertarianism, but these are not suffient >>for those holding unsympathetic values (e.g. intolerance). >>What is sufficent for those not holding liberty-sympathetic values is a >>mind receptive to new ideas and to reason. What is necessary in that case >>is a sound argument. >> >>Fred Foldvary Reuven Brenner Professor, Repap Chair in Economics Faculty of Management McGill University Tel: 514-398-7327 Fax: 514-398-3876 ====================================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Nov 1996 15:54:58 -0500 From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) Re this matter of contractarian theories of morals, and animals: Au contraire, my friends: an "abstract discussion" *is* needed here. For people have raised the general question, and one would answer it irrelevantly if one said, "Well *this* persons has an obligation to *that* animal. In our family, like so many, we have a pet (cat, in this case), and certainly it has "rights" - it gets quite a bit of attention, and people would call other people to account if it didn't, etc. But the question is whether there is any general reason, applying in virtue of the way people are and the way animals are, to suppose that they, or some large subset of them, should as such be recognized as having rights. And the answer remains in the negative. There is no reason to refrain from "using" animals as we will, including grinding them up for hamburger should we decide to do so. This, as I have emphasized in my writings on the subject (for example, the chapter on the subject in my book, _Moral Matters_), is not only because animals in general just aren't up to the level of interaction it takes to get into the general principles business, but also because we really just don't have any *need* for any such muturally-negotiated restrictions on our respective behaviors. With people, there surely is. __________________________________________________________________________ Jan Narveson (Professor) Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1 (519) 888-4567-1-2780# (from touch-tone); or 885-1211, ext. 2780 (via switchboard); FAX (519) 746-3097 Home: (519) 886-1673 (answering machine) e-mail: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca ====================================================================== Date: 29 Nov 1996 02:55:03 -0500 From: "Robert Sade" Reply to: RE>>equality of persons vs. nonpersons *> Human beings are living things, and are subject to the same > requirements. They must do whatever they must do, or die. Anything goes. Anything goes physically, subject to physical restraints, but because human beings are moral agents, not-anything goes morally.* Right. Exactly the point I made later in the message. *> Human beings are different in one critical way that distinguishes them > from other animals. They can reason: they can choose between options, not by > the instincts that determine the choices of other animals , but by > conceptualizing the world in abstract terms, fashioning a unique fulfillment > of their own lives (as only a person can), and most importantly, recognizing > the capacity of other persons to do the same. > This last is the basis for the > notion of `rights': in order to live a HUMAN life, every person must be > allowed to pursue his own idea of the best life he can live. It's not clear what "must" means here. To fully use reason, a person needs liberty. But the need by itself does not establish a right. To live, a human being also needs food, but that does not imply that others must feed him. And if "anything goes," then why MUST persons "allow" other persons anything, even if they need it?* You are quite correct when you say that needs do not establish rights-- I agree. But I didn't use the phrase 'needs liberty', you did. People don't need liberty, they 'have' liberty-- it inalienably adheres to them because they are persons. In this sense, liberty is not a value, as food is. Certain facts-- reason, its individuality, and the uniqueness of personal circumstances-- impose a particular reality on human beings; the reality is that each person must sustain his life by finding or creating food, clothing, shelter, and the rest-- if he doesn't, he will die. It is this requirement that underlies my statement that 'every person must be allowed to pursue his own idea of the best life he can live', and is the foundation of rights. (It's also my response to your comment, "It's not clear what "must" means here".) In this sense, rights are not goods or services (the 20th century perversion of the notion of rights), they are freedoms of action-- to speak, to create and hold property, to trade, etc. *> Animals do not have the capacity to reason, to choose on rational > grounds, to be blamed or praised for their actions. They are not moral > agents, they have no rights It does not logically follow from the premise that animals "are not moral agents" that "they have no rights." Moral agency implies that the actions of an agent are moral acts, i.e. can be judged to be morally good, evil, or neutral. The range of such judgment, i.e. the set of acts subject to such judgment, remains to be determined. In a universal ethic which is also comprehensive in acts, all acts, hence also those committed on animals, are subject to moral judgment.* May I fill in the missing steps in my earlier concise comments: (short version) rights describe freedoms of action (free choice); free choice (choosing among alternatives) is possible only for rational animals; animals other than man have no capacity for reason (possible exceptions aside); therefore, animals cannot make free choices and therefore can not have rights. As for your statement, "all acts [here I would add 'of persons'], hence also those committed on animals, are subject to moral judgment", I agree, but the standard of judgment is the degree to which a given act 1) supports the life of the actor, and 2) does not violate the rights of other rights-bearers (persons). It is not wrong to kill an animal merely because it is an animal. It may be right to kill a rabbit for food or because it is digging up your vegetable garden and threatening your food supply (McGregor may have been the good guy instead of Peter), but it may be wrong to kill the same rabbit because you want to see an animal suffer (the act may diminish your own life in several ways). (Incidentally, standard #1 and standard #2 above apply to moral judgments, but only standard #2 can be the basis of law [protection against rights violations].) Thus, you may not have been quite on target when you said *"Indeed, my original question remains unanswered (responses so far do not solve the puzzle). That question is, if it is evil to deliberately kill a person, why is it not evil to kill a non-person?"* My response answers your question, at least insofar as my initial premises are correct (that continuing life is the aim of living things, and that the life of a human being depends on his use of reason.) Others may attempt to answer your question starting from different premises; then, we can talk about whether those are valid or not. From the point of view of this medical scientist/surgeon, your question is an extremely important one with profound practical implications for biological research. Thank you for asking it. Best regards. --Bob ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 05:43:08 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary Subject: persons vs. nonpersons On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Jan Narveson wrote: > Au contraire, my friends: an "abstract discussion" *is* needed here. Well said. > animals in general just aren't up to the > level of interaction it takes to get into the general principles business, This is so regarding pragmatic and practical reasons for having rules, but it either denies the premise (that there is an inherent, universal ethic applicable for persons) or if this argument agrees with the premise, then the question is, why is "interaction" a reason for differing ethical values for persons and nonpersons. If there is a set of human beings who do not interact, then would they be treated as animals? > but also because we really just don't have any *need* for any such > muturally-negotiated restrictions on our respective behaviors. The same questions apply as in the previous paragraph, substituting "need" for "interaction". Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 05:59:42 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On 29 Nov 1996, Robert Sade wrote: > Certain facts-- reason, its individuality, and the uniqueness of personal > circumstances-- impose a particular reality on human beings; the reality is > that each person must sustain his life by finding or creating food, clothing, > shelter, and the rest-- if he doesn't, he will die. It is this requirement > that underlies my statement that 'every person must be allowed to pursue his > own idea of the best life he can live', and is the foundation of rights. It seems that you have an instrumental reason for rights, that IF a person is not "allowed" to freely pursue his life, then he won't be as well off. One "must" be allowed to do things to sustain life in order to live well. But the question remains, why is this instrumental requirement a basis for claiming rights? Animals too "must" be able to have a habitat and allowed the ability to use it to survive; yet you do not posit that as a basis for rights for animals. > May I fill in the missing steps in my earlier concise comments: (short > version) rights describe freedoms of action (free choice) I have a different definition of a right, namely, a correlative of a wrong. In my definition, a right to X [e.g. to live] means that the negation of X [e.g. killing] is wrong [evil or illegal, depending on whether it is a moral or legal right]. By this definition, animals could have rights if certain acts committed on them are evil or illegal. But "rights" per se was not really the original topic, which concened good and evil, and why if by premise it is evil to murder a human being, killing an animal does not have the same moral value. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 08:53:55 +0000 Subject: Re: Convincing people with Universal Ethics > There is no argument that would convince Anyone Anytime. We don't need that. Just an argument which will convince rational honest people now. > We just have to recognize that; we are not > the Universal Benefactors with our political views. We are the benefactors > of those with values like ours - which I sincerely hope is the bulk of the > populace. I disagree. I'd say we are the "benefactors" of all humanity, if by "benefactors" you mean "advancing ideas which will benefit so-and-so." All people would benefit from freedom. Advancing the cause of liberty is good for everyone, not just for capitalists. ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 09:20:36 +0000 > But "rights" per se was not really the original topic, which concened > good and evil, and why if by premise it is evil to murder a human being, > killing an animal does not have the same moral value. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Beacuse animals aren't humans. Just because it is wrong to do X to a human being doesn't get us started _at all_ investigating whether it is right wrong or indifferent to do X to a non-human. To take a silly example (not to trivialize your argument, but to illustrate my point), we can all agree it is wrong to insult a person. So why wouldn't it be wrong to insult a rock? That's just the wrong way to think about it - the question is, is there any reason why I _shouldn't_ insult a rock? If not, then if I have reason to do it, that's enough. OK, so it's wrong (in general) to kill humans, so you ask why isn't it wrong to kill a cow? But the issue is, is there any reason why it's wrong to kill a cow? We _might_ come up with reasons not to torture the cow, but as to killing it quickly? Does it have some life-plan which would be interfered with by the killing? Does it have a future-concept which would be taken away? Does its family love it and depend on it? "No" to all of those. Does it have a right to life? No. In fact, its entire existence is due to the fact that other animals, e.g., us, can eat it. Providing milk and meat is what cows are "for." We might approach the killing of them with respect, or even reverence, as do the kosher slaughterers, but it's still ok to kill them. The point is, the fact that it's wrong to treat a person a certain way has no relevance to how we may treat non-persons, _because_ they're not persons. ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 08:40:45 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Fri, 29 Nov 1996, Aeon Skoble wrote: > > But "rights" per se was not really the original topic, which concened > > good and evil, and why if by premise it is evil to murder a human being, > > killing an animal does not have the same moral value. > > Because animals aren't humans. Just because it is wrong to do X to a > human being doesn't get us started _at all_ investigating whether it > is right wrong or indifferent to do X to a non-human. The question is, given that we accept some non-arbitrary moral rules for human beings, i.e given that the actions of persons are subject to moral judgment, then what are the rules regarding non-persons? We do get started if we seek to understand ethics in a comprehensive way. > ... the question is, is there any reason why I > _shouldn't_ insult a rock? If the question is, "why should I not harm an animal?", this complex way of saying it can be simplified to: "Is it evil to harm an animal?" If it is not evil, then there is no reason why one "should" not harm it. If it is evil, then one should not harm it because it is morally wrong. > ... Does [a cow] > it have some life-plan which would be interfered with by the killing? Animals resist being killed. > Does it have a future-concept which would be taken away? We don't know. > Does its > family love it and depend on it? Calves depend on mama cows. (And what about a loner person with no family?) > "No" to all of those. How do we know? > Does it have > a right to life? No. I don't yet see how that answer is warranted. > In fact, its entire existence is due to the > fact that other animals, e.g., us, can eat it. When human slaves were bred, their existence was due to other people using them also. > Providing milk and > meat is what cows are "for." To some persons. To other persons, such as Hindus, cows have other purposes. And the cow has its own life. > The point is, the fact that it's wrong > to treat a person a certain way has no relevance to how we may treat > non-persons, _because_ they're not persons. I agree that moral rules may differ with respect to action upon persons and non-persons, but this does not yet answer the original question of how we know what is the proper moral treatment regarding non-persons. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 11:20:50 +0000 > The question is, given that we accept some non-arbitrary moral rules > for human beings, i.e given that the actions of persons are subject > to moral judgment, then what are the rules regarding non-persons? > We do get started if we seek to understand ethics in a comprehensive > way. I agree with this, but maintain that animals don't have rights. Rights are a "person thing." Learning the rules about how to deal with each other, e.g., don't eat your neighbor for dinner, doesn't mean that those rules apply to non-persons, e.g, don't eat a cow for dinner. > "Is it evil to harm an animal?" > If it is not evil, then there is no reason why one "should" not harm it. > If it is evil, then one should not harm it because it is morally wrong. Yes, I agree. I'd argue in support of the first. > Animals resist being killed. Yes. It's natural for them to do so. But it's also natural for other animals to eat them. It isn't "immoral" when nature takes its course. > > In fact, its entire existence is due to the > > fact that other animals, e.g., us, can eat it. > > When human slaves were bred, their existence was due to other people > using them also. Yes, but those were _humans_, so they're subject to the moral rules we were talking about before. A conception of human rights has to be universal w.r.t humans, but not all creatures, so we can say that using humans as slaves is immoral, but "enslaving" a cow, i.e., having it graze only on _your_ fields until you decide to eat it, isn't the same _because_ it doesn't involve a person. > To other persons, such as Hindus, cows have other > purposes. This might be a mistaken metaphysics. If you're starving to death, and still refuse to eat a cow, you may have made a mistake about the natural world. Of course, Hindus don't mind eating chickens, so it's not animals in general which get this moral status, but just cows. That's their business. But from the point of view of biology, that kind of animal occupies a certain place on the food chain, as do we. Of course we might choose to refrain from something out of nutritional concerns, but that's not because of that thing's rights. > I agree that moral rules may differ with respect to action upon > persons and non-persons, but this does not yet answer the original > question of how we know what is the proper moral treatment regarding > non-persons. Fair enough. I'd say that we don't answer this question with reference to human notions such as rights. But I see what you're after now, a standard for morality w.r.t human treatement of the non-human. I'll think about that some more. Meanwhile, maybe someone else will jump in. Aeon ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 09:39:22 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Fri, 29 Nov 1996, Aeon Skoble wrote: > > We do get started if we seek to understand ethics in a comprehensive > > way. > > I agree with this, but maintain that animals don't have rights. > Rights are a "person thing." These are so far assertions yet to be warranted, are they not? The issue is, what argument leads to such conclusion? > Learning the rules about how to deal > with each other, e.g., don't eat your neighbor for dinner, doesn't > mean that those rules apply to non-persons, e.g, don't eat a cow for > dinner. I have agreed that rules for non-persons are not derived from rules for persons; the question is whether the derivation of a non-arbitrary ethic is comprehensive for all acts, including those to non-persons, or else whether such an ethic can only be derived for acts concerning persons, leaving an ethical lacuna for non-persons. > > Animals resist being killed. > Yes. It's natural for them to do so. But it's also natural for > other animals to eat them. It isn't "immoral" when nature takes its > course. I addressed this before, in that the acts of persons are morally judged and the acts of non-persons are non-moral. This does not answer the question of the acts of persons upon non-persons. > > > In fact, its entire existence is due to the > > > fact that other animals, e.g., us, can eat it. > > When human slaves were bred, their existence was due to other people > > using them also. > Yes, but those were _humans_, so they're subject to the moral rules > we were talking about before. The point I was trying to make is, that the mere fact that a being's existence is due to their usefulness to other beings does not by itself make the use morally right. > > I agree that moral rules may differ with respect to action upon > > persons and non-persons, but this does not yet answer the original > > question of how we know what is the proper moral treatment regarding > > non-persons. > > Fair enough. I'd say that we don't answer this question with > reference to human notions such as rights. Does that not beg the question, since we have not yet determined the rules for good and evil concerning animals? We have not yet determined the set of beings that have rights, since we have not determined the moral rules for non-persons. > But I see what you're > after now, a standard for morality w.r.t human treatement of the > non-human. I'll think about that some more. Meanwhile, maybe > someone else will jump in. I hope the question is now clearer, as I would like to know whether ethical philosphy as developed so far has come up with an answer. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 18:20:24 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" Subject: The argument against killing I assume Fred's question would be better phrased as: What [valid] argument leading to that it is wrong to kill a human will not also lead to it being wrong to kill an animal? Right, Fred? Svein Olav Nyberg "The danger already exists that mathematicians have made a covenant http://www.uio.no/~solan/ with the devil to darken the spirit and confine man in the bonds of Hell" -- Augustine ====================================================================== From: EMARAT@HARVARDA.HARVARD.EDU Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 05:59:42 -0800 (PST) >>But "rights" per se was not really the original topic, which concened good and evil, and why if by premise it is evil to murder a human being, killing an animal does not have the same moral value. Fred Foldvary<< While "rights" may not be the original topic, whether or not killing an animal is immoral is directly linked to the issue of the "rights" of animals. In "Persons, Rights and the Moral Community" Loren Lomasky addresses the issue of animals rights and concludes that it is indeed moral to kill animals because they are not rights holders. It's an elegant arguement which I won't try to recapitulate here because at seven pages it's quite concise and because I don't think I can do it justice. Eleftheria Maratos-Flier ====================================================================== From: EMARAT@HARVARDA.HARVARD.EDU Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 09:20:36 +0000 Aeon Skoble writes: >>>Beacuse animals aren't humans. Just because it is wrong to do X to a human being doesn't get us started _at all_ investigating whether it is right wrong or indifferent to do X to a non-human.<<< But what if you encountered an intelligent, peace loving alien from Alpha Centuri that happened to look and whose meant happened to taste like lamb? Is it OK to eat it? Eleftheria Maratos-Flier ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 10:45:49 -0800 From: EMARAT@HARVARDA.HARVARD.EDU >>If the question is, "why should I not harm an animal?", this complex way of saying it can be simplified to: "Is it evil to harm an animal?" If it is not evil, then there is no reason why one "should" not harm it. If it is evil, then one should not harm it because it is morally wrong. Fred Foldvary<< Would it be evil to euthanize my elderly dog who is deaf and arthritic if he developed pneumonia? Would it be evil to kill my 3 1/2 month old puppy by cutting of one of her legs and letting her bleed to death? Is it evil to to put away stray animals without homes? Is it evil for a dog owner with adequate resources to lock it in the basement and let it starve to death? Is it evil to sterilize the family pet without offering it an opportunity to breed? Some actions towards animals may be evil. That doesn't mean that all are. Eleftheria Maratos-Flier ====================================================================== Date: Fri, 29 Nov 1996 10:55:35 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary Subject: Re: The argument against killing On Fri, 29 Nov 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > I assume Fred's question would be better phrased as: > What [valid] argument leading to that it is > wrong to kill a human will not also lead to > it being wrong to kill an animal? > Right, Fred? I would put it this way: If there is a non-arbitrary, universally applicable ethic whose rules designate the murder of a person (by another person) as evil, then what are the rules of that ethic concerning non-persons, and how are those rules derived? Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Sat, 30 Nov 1996 06:53:00 -0600 From: "Geoffrey S. Nathan" Subject: Animal rights again Eleftheria wrote: >Would it be evil to euthanize my elderly dog who is deaf and arthritic >if he developed pneumonia? Would it be evil to kill my 3 1/2 >month old puppy by cutting of one of her legs and letting her >bleed to death? Is it evil to to put away stray animals without >homes? Is it evil for a dog owner with adequate resources to >lock it in the basement and let it starve to death? Is >it evil to sterilize the family pet without offering it an >opportunity to breed? One of the issues that hasn't come up in this discussion is one I've thought about some. Not all animals are equal, and what differentiates them, at least in part, is the extent to which they are individuals. Consider, for example, Alice being introduced to the ham. It seems to me that the more an animal becomes a distinct individual the more uncomfortable we are with doing it harm. Hence, it's much worse to kill a pet dog than a wild one. And of course, the extent to which animals HAVE idividual characteristics is highly relevant here, since that seems to correlate with intelligence. I can't imagine becoming attached to an ant, and mice seem pretty much the same to me, but we all know that dogs are quite different in personality, and apes even more so. People are obviously at the extreme end, although it has always seemed to me that the loss of a newborn was not as painful as the loss of a toddler precisely because newborns don't have much personality yet. Similarly for those in comas. Not that I think infants don't have rights--I'm sure they do. And I don't want to assign rights to cows. Yet again, there's a difference between the status of Milky White (in Sondheim's Into the Woods) and the angus whose filet I ate last week. Just musing early on a holiday weekend. Cheers, Geoff Geoff Nathan 420 Heritage Rd., Carbondale, IL, 62901 (618) 549-0106 (Home) (618) 453-3421 (Office) ====================================================================== Date: Sat, 30 Nov 1996 12:52:43 -0500 (EST) From: llomask@OPIE.BGSU.EDU On Thu, 28 Nov 1996, Robert Sade wrote: > Animals do not have the capacity to reason, to choose on rational > grounds, to be blamed or praised for their actions. They are not moral > agents, they have no rights, they can be killed to further the lives (broadly > conceived) of other living things, including human beings. The question of > what human beings do to non-persons (or to non-moral agents) is not a moral > question--such issues apply only to persons. There may be SOCIAL or LEGAL or > other reasons not to kill animals, but not moral reasons. Here and in some of the other posts on this topic there is an implicit conflation between a being *having rights* and there being *moral reasons* that govern its treatment. I think this is a confusion. What rights are, who has them, and the nature of the duties consequent on those rights is part of morality. It is by no means the whole of morality. Libertarians above all should be wary of that conflation, as we suppose that rights impose only minimal forbearance toward others, and so the domain within which we are at liberty to set our own course is wide indeed. Morality does not only delimit the boundaries of that domain (i.e., rights) but addresses itself to navigation within (i.e., all the rest of morality). For what it's worth, I am persuaded that animals don't have rights but that *of course* morality speaks to how they ought to be treated. If it were mute concerning callous indifference or malicious infliction of cruelty on sentient creatures it would be pretty paltry stuff. Loren Lomasky ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 08:11:31 +0000 > From: EMARAT@HARVARDA.HARVARD.EDU > But what if you encountered an intelligent, peace loving alien > from Alpha Centuri that happened to look and whose meant happened > to taste like lamb? Is it OK to eat it? No, that's why I usually discuss this in terms of persons, rather than humans. If I slipped into "humans" that was mere sloppiness. Sorry. ====================================================================== Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 14:31:28 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" > But what if you encountered an intelligent, peace loving alien > from Alpha Centuri that happened to look and whose meant happened > to taste like lamb? Is it OK to eat it? If hypotheticals like these are to be considered, what about the different stages of evolution? When did this creature acquire rights? At stage Australopithecus, Neanderthal, .. or as early as when it was swinging around in trees .. ? Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 07:12:14 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Mon, 2 Dec 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > > But what if you encountered an intelligent, peace loving alien > > from Alpha Centuri that happened to look and whose meant happened > > to taste like lamb? Is it OK to eat it? > > If hypotheticals like these are to be considered, what about > the different stages of evolution? When did this creature > acquire rights? At stage Australopithecus, Neanderthal, .. > or as early as when it was swinging around in trees .. ? The question of non-person rights has not been resolved, so the rights of pre-person man are left hanging pending such resolution. If the question concerns personhood (i.e. when did the genus homo achieve the qualities whereby behavior is based predominately on reasoned choice, and thus the corresponding rights pertaining specifically to personhood?), then is this not a matter for historical anthropology rather than ethical philosophy? Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 15:40:50 +0000 From: "Svein Olav G. Nyberg" >The question of non-person rights has not been resolved, so the >rights of pre-person man are left hanging pending such resolution. The point here is that there might not be such a sharp border between creatures "with rights" and creatures "without rights". How is this situation to be handled? It is of importance, in that it also sheds light on what theories of "right" are plainly untenable. So we might have believed we had a theory of rights that was all OK, but which fails to say anything sensible about the continuous transition from animal to human. That theory must at least be modified. Connecting this to your question: IF we have a theory of persons' rights, then what is our theory of non-persons' rights? Well, we now have a smaller selection of theories to choose from, and can thus make a more precise reply. >If the question concerns personhood [..], then is this not a matter >for historical anthropology rather than ethical philosophy? There is a question to be resolved philosophically before that empirical investigation can take place: Is "personhood" a black and white matter, or is it a matter of graduality? My personal opinion is that it is a matter of graduality. You can agree or disagree, but you cannot deny that the position taken has some ramifications in moral theory. Svein Olav ====================================================================== Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 08:29:58 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary On Mon, 2 Dec 1996, Svein Olav G. Nyberg wrote: > The point here is that there might not be such a sharp border > between creatures "with rights" and creatures "without rights". > How is this situation to be handled? As I said, it has not been determined here (in this forum thread) that non-person living beings are "without rights." If non-persons have some rights, then the problem is not so difficult, since it is then a matter of the types and degrees of rights, the evolution to personhood gradually conferring ever greater rights. Indeed, the evolutionary question buttresses the argument for non-persons having rights. > It is of importance, in that it also sheds light on what theories > of "right" are plainly untenable. So we might have believed we > had a theory of rights that was all OK, but which fails to say > anything sensible about the continuous transition from animal to > human. That theory must at least be modified. Agreed, and a very good point. The proposition that non-persons have no rights has that problem. > There is a question to be resolved philosophically before that > empirical investigation can take place: Is "personhood" a black > and white matter, or is it a matter of graduality? My personal > opinion is that it is a matter of graduality. You can agree or > disagree, but you cannot deny that the position taken has some > ramifications in moral theory. The same question pertains to an embryo: at what stage does it become a person, and is this a gradual transition? The brain of an embryo obviously develops gradually, and if the criterion concerns a functioning mind, then this too is a gradual development. A pre-person embryo is at least an animal, and if animals have rights, then again the transition is less problematic. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== Date: Mon, 2 Dec 1996 17:21:50 -0800 (PST) From: Fred Foldvary In the discussion of the ethics of acts committed on non-persons, someone invoked Loren Lomasky's *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community*, and then Loren Lomasky himself stated that evil could be done to animals, but they have no rights. There was no follow-up to this line of thought, so I will comment briefly and summarize the discussion so far. First of all, the topic is conditional on the acceptance of persons as moral agents, and some non-arbitrary ethic. Some have claimed that evil does not apply to non-persons because they are not in the same social community and because persons need to be unrestricted to fully function; and I found neither of these arguments to be persuasive. Some asserted that evil does apply to animals, but gave no warrants (reasoning) for the proposition. Let me clarify my language at this point to prevent semantical misunderstanding. When I say "evil" in this context (evil acts committed on non-persons) that implies a rights-violating act, because I define a right as a function of moral evil (as a correlative of a moral wrong). I realize that some, such as Loren Lomasky, distinguish between rights and evil. I don't disagree with the separation in substance, but we need to have a common terminology, so let me designate evil-1 (one) as an act which society may prohibit as a moral imperative to avoid, and evil-2 as an act which is merely undesirable, nasty, or unsocial, but that should not be legally prohibited. When I say "evil," I mean evil-1. My approach at a derivation of a universal ethic (in The Soul of Liberty and Natural Rights) is to derive an ethic that is comprehensive for all acts of a moral agent, thus including acts on non-persons. I see no reason to distinguish among species or between persons and non-persons in designating the acts of moral agents as good, evil, or neutral. However, the application of the ethic does depend on the type of actor and the type of being acted upon. Hence, while evil can be committed against any living being, the degree of evil depends on the being (bacteria vs. person). Also, the application of the ethic differs, say, between children and adults. Loren Lomasky takes a different approach, deriving rights (hence evil-1) such that the conclusion is that evil-1 is only committed on persons, while evil-2 may be committed to non-persons, but its prohibition is not a moral imperative. Lomasky bases this conclusion on the nature of persons as project pursuers, which he claims persons are and non-persons are not. In his discussion on animals (pp. 221-7), Lomasky finds a flaw in pro-animal-rights arguments that posit some "morally central property" (p. 223). But is the capacity to pursue a project not such a property? A full exploration of the ethics of acts on non-persons hence takes us to the derivation of ethics, which is probably beyond the scope of this medium and forum. The conclusion I draw from the discussion is thus that there is no *brief* reason provided as to whether acts on non-persons can be evil. Either the arguments are too long and complex for a brief explanation, or such arguments remain unwarranted by sound arguments. Since it is my belief that any argument can be boiled down to email-bite-size, I view the latter as more likely. Fred Foldvary ====================================================================== From: "Aeon Skoble" Date: Tue, 3 Dec 1996 08:37:45 +0000 > Let me clarify my language at this point to prevent semantical > misunderstanding. When I say "evil" in this context (evil > acts committed on non-persons) that implies a rights-violating > act, because I define a right as a function of moral evil > (as a correlative of a moral wrong). OK - I tend to agree - but I was arguing that non-person animals don't have the right not to be killed. Therefore, according to your definintion, it's not evil to kill them. The fact that I say this doesn't mean that I am in favor of torturing them, or slaughtering them for no reason, and so on. But for eating, or medical research, that's morally permissible as far as I can discern, partly because it violates no rights. > The conclusion I draw from the discussion is thus that there > is no *brief* reason provided as to whether acts on non-persons > can be evil. I wouldn't deny that acts on non-persons _can_ be evil - I'm sure they can. But killing livestock isn't in that category, because they don't have a right not to be killed and eaten. In fact, I'm tempted to say that there's a symmetry there - humans do not have a right not to be eaten by a shark!