There are 3 posts below: 1. Some Assumptions of Anti-Individualism, by Tibor Machan 2. A comment on that post by Stephen Cox 3. Some Comments on Group Constructivism, by Tibor Machan ======================================================================== >Date: Thu, 22 Jun 1995 07:22:54 -0500 (CDT) >From: Tibor R Machan >Subject: Re: Anti-Individualism Some of you might find this of some interest - I had posted it some weeks ago to a list called SOCETH-L which was overcrowded with socialist, collectivist, neo-Marxist types. I got a lot of very negative reactions for a while, to some initial posts along these lines, so I finally laid it out as follows. I do not mean to take so much of your time but as I read over it I thought it could be of interest to some folks on this list. Best, Tibor Machan Some Assumptions of Anti-Individualism Tibor R. Machan In social theory, ever since Machiavelli, there has been a great deal of hope that we can identify factors that explain human community affairs. Hobbes's social-political philosophy, that of several classical liberals (e.g., Bernard Mandeville, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith) and especially Karl Marx's view, presented the human individual as essentially impotent as an agent. The reason is that the underlying ontology involved in all these views allowed only for one kind of, namely efficient, causation. This is the kind of causation that classical mechanics identifies as universal in nature -- exhibited best, perhaps, on the pool table, between the white ball and the others. (Engels, Marx's partner, tried to inject a change with his elaboration of dialectical materialism, drawing from Hegel's dialectics and combining this with Feuerbach's materialism, but it is not clear that Marx himself accepted this as anything other than a heuristic device for purposes of social analysis, via his historical dialectics.) In any case, the bulk of 19th and 20th century social science rests on the view that everything in nature is moved by antecedent (physical) forces, which clearly makes it impossible for an individual to be an agent or cause of what he or she does. The idea that such causation is possible was revived by Kant, but he had to introduce the mysterious realm of the noumena for this, a kind of spiritual element that made sense of the freedom of the human will. Kant was perhaps the sole champion of genuine human agency, autonomy, willingness, but even he tied this to a religious viewpoint. Apart from Kant hardly anyone except a few Aristotelians in the early 20th century (e.g., H. W. B. Joseph) defended the idea that human individuals have causal powers, can be first causes. Teleology, the idea that the cosmos has room for future oriented (final) causation, not just antecedent causes, without an intelligent (divine) agent, was nearly completely banished from philosophy by positivism, among other movements. And social theory certain made no room for this, nor psychology. It is thus not at all surprising that social theorists would find individualism incredible. To change this view would require a convincing argument concerning, first, the metaphysical/ontological possibility of human self-determination. Only a few Aristotelians, Ayn Rand, some philosophers, and the late Nobel Laureate Roger W. Sperry, a psychophysicist, seem to have defended this position extensively. I am one of them. I find this view more sensible because of its overall explanatory power and because it is non-reductivist about natural kinds, the fundamental kinds of things that can be part of nature without having to be all the same. My arguments in social theory rest on a very broad philosophical idea that because of the kind of entity human beings are, namely, rational animals, capable of forming ideas as an essential element of their form of life, they are capable of being first causes. This is the novelty they bring to nature with their evolution. The social implications of this are varied but one is that a human individual is a responsible, choosing agent who, in adulthood, has moral responsibilities to fulfill and needs a society with a structure that makes such responsible conduct possible. This structure is a system of basic rights to life, liberty and property. No doubt, there is a lot here that needs to be defended - which I've tried to do in my several books - but this is not simple ideology, construction of a system of thought to suit some kind of economic bias of mine or whatever. It makes the best sense based on what I can only say has been diligent, independent thinking, with no loyalty to anything but the facts as I have been able to understand them via a method of relentless criticism, argument, exchange, research, etc. This is why all the name calling and such is entirely beside the point to what I have been trying to do on this list. ========================================================================= >From: sdcox@ucsd.edu >Date: Thu, 22 Jun 1995 11:18:00 -0700 >Subject: Re[2]: Anti-Individualism Tibor, While you're listing defenders of individual human agency, why don't you include Isabel Paterson, in "The God of the Machine"? (Especially because you're including Rand, for instance, who learned a lot from Paterson.) Also, I see Adam Smith listed as one who regarded individuals as essentially impotent. I think that his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" expounds a more complex view. I hate to say such an awful thing, but on this issue see my book, "The Stranger Within Thee: Concepts of the Self in Late-Eighteenth-Century Literature," pp. 29-33. (I'm not so much of an individualist as not to consider my self-advertisement rather embarrassing. But what the hell, I might as well note the recent edition, with intro. and editorial matter by me, of Paterson's "The God of the Machine" [Transaction Publishers].) Best, Stephen Cox ========================================================================= >Date: Mon, 3 Jul 1995 18:46:02 -0500 (CDT) >From: Tibor R Machan >Subject: Re: Groupism A sociologist colleague of mine and I got into a brief exchange about just how dependent on is upon the group in which one grows up and lives for one's identity and ideas and this came out as my brief on the topic. I hope I am not wasting your time with it but it might be of some interest. Best, Tibor Machan Some Comments on Group Constructivism Tibor R. Machan A favorite theme of not just sociologists but some philosophers has always been the idea that our understanding or "interpretation" of reality is the result of group effort. From the most minute fact to the most comprehensive concepts, not excluding who we ourselves are, we are supposedly thinking just as the group to which we belong is supposed to do. Richard Rorty has called this "solidarity" and contrasts it with the alternative ideal of objectivity, something her regards a myth. This groupist line of thinking is a challenge to those who hold that the individual makes a substantial contribution to the formation of concepts, ideas, theories, and principles that amount to our "view" of reality. Indeed, some think the individual can know the world s it is and can tilt against the crowd, reject its demands if it goes astray, if it requires the distortion of reality. Such individualist thinking proposes that we cannot make sense of political dissidents and rebellion from the groupist framework. Individualists think there are some levels of consciousness or awareness that make possible direct knowledge of reality and that if this is true, then the group can be kept in check, however much its teachings is going to be very useful, of course. One of the central problems with the groupist thinking is that it is self-invalidating. If everything is a matter of what the group constructs, nothing a matter of direct, objective knowledge, then, of course, the group think idea is itself no more than the creation of some group. And there is no way, then, to verify or validate it, to show its truth. All one can hope for is to gain agreement to it. What if the dominant group wants to reject groupism and prefers individualism and objectivism? From the groupist viewpoint there is nothing that one can object to about this. If the group believes it strongly enough, than individualism is right. But then both individualism and groupism turn out to be right, which is not possible. It isn't that there is a firm place of individual awareness amidst much that we happen to pick up from those around us, taking a short cut, as it were, so as to avoid having to learn things on our own. Clearly we would learn very little if all we did is rely on personal effort. We would still be in the cave, never reaching the level of complex understanding of our world we have evidently reached. But the groupist is caught in a paradox because he cannot start the process of understanding -- at some point some member of the group had to have gotten things started. Nor can he make clear sense of the persistent phenomenon of individual criticism and rebellion against some dominant group thinking. So thoroughgoing groupism cannot be right. If it were, it would also be wrong, which is nonsense. Which does not mean that we do not in fact very, very often obtain our concepts, understanding, values and so forth from our fellows who have formed a cohesive group -- a church, nation, club, family, or some ethnic, gender or racial collective. Only that there is a check we can perform on these groups if we begin to be suspicious that they have gone astray. We are perceptually, for example, connected to the world quite directly, as we notice the shapes, colors and other qualities of objects around us. ------------------------------------------- Tibor R. Machan teaches philosophy at Auburn University, AL.