>Date: Tue, 26 Mar 1996 19:42:47 -0800 >From: jmlib (jmlib) >To: libprofs >Subject: ethical foundation A new LibProfs subscriber, Jeffrey Friedman of Critical Review, brought up an interesting question regarding the ethical foundations of the "libertarian" movement and philosophy: should it more properly be based on consequentialism (freedom is good because it leads to the most desirable results) or deontologicalism (freedom is desirable regardless of its effects on human welfare). I brought up the suggestion that perhaps these are not irreconcilable, that in fact they may be two sides of the same coin (e.g., I consider freedom from coercion as part of my welfare, and I have the impression that when humans live in freedom they naturally tend to maximize their welfare anyway) ... whereupon Jeffrey asked for a much more rigorous demonstration than I am currently able to give :-). He suggested that perhaps this could be started by consistently applying Austrian economics extensively to the real world (e.g., what ended the Depression, what caused the postwar boom, what was the effect of the Industrial Revolution on workers, what about the "robber barons", etc.), and then moving on into history, sociology, anthropology, political science, etc. So, what do you think? I leave the topic in your hands ... ========================================================================== >From: "Aeon Skoble" >To: jmlib (jmlib), libprofs >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 08:31:02 CST6CDT > should it more properly be based on consequentialism (freedom is > good because it leads to the most desirable results) or > deontologicalism (freedom is desirable regardless of its effects on > human welfare). As John suggests, libertarianism could both be intrinsically right AND have beneficial consequences. But deontology and consequentialism cannot both be correct moral theories, as they contradict each other. So if the task is to convince another moral philosopher of the moral worth of libertarianism, it may not help to say that all roads lead to Rome. Also, let's not forget that deontology and consequentialism are not the only two approaches to ethical theorizing. Indeed, they represent a false dichotomy. The Aristoltelian approach to ethics, emphasizing character rather than action, represents a distinct third option. Much work has been done the last decade or so demonstrating that Aristotelian ethics (or at least a neo-Aristotelian approach to ethics) is (a) more coherent and complete as an ethical theory and (b) a fine way to ground individual-rights theory. Tibor Machan has been purusing this line since the seventies, and Doug Den Uyl and Doug Rasmussen have also made great strides in this area. (Contrary to popular opinion, I'd say that Mill also appeals to an Aristotelian conception of human happiness in his defense of libertarianism, but that's neither here nor there.) I don't know if "applying Austrian economics" will demonstrate that libertarianism is the most morally worthwhile system, because all it will do is show that state intervention decreases productivity. We already know that, lefties know it too, but they think there are values which trump economic growth and individual freedom. I have some marxists friends, and they don't argue with me that free market economics maximizes human freedom and leads to economic growth. They argue that too much freedom isn't good. Austrian economics won't refute that. It must be approached through moral philosophy one way or the other, and I suggest Aristotelian ethics. Aeon Skoble ========================================================================== >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 96 09:23:52 EST >From: (George Selgin) >To: libprofs In Message Tue, 26 Mar 1996 19:42:47 -0800, jmlib@lumina.ucsd.edu (jmlib) writes: > A new LibProfs subscriber, Jeffrey Friedman of Critical Review, >brought up an interesting question regarding the ethical foundations >of the "libertarian" movement and philosophy: should it more properly >be based on consequentialism (freedom is good because it leads to the >most desirable results) or deontologicalism (freedom is desirable >regardless of its effects on human welfare). I brought up the >suggestion that perhaps these are not irreconcilable, that in fact >they may be two sides of the same coin (e.g., I consider freedom from >coercion as part of my welfare, and I have the impression that when >humans live in freedom they naturally tend to maximize their welfare >anyway) It seems to me that any attempt to "reconcile" deontologicalism and consequentialism must itself be grounded in consequentialism. That is to say that only a consequentialist will be impressed by such a reconciliation, whereas a consistent deontologist (?) should't give a hoot whether the two approaches can be reconciled or not. To put this yet another way, it seems to me that consequentialism is the only game in town for those of us who seek to alter the views of nonlibertarians--especially nonlibertarian consequentialists ("we believe that freedom makes people worse off"). A true nonlibertarian deontologist ("I believe restrictions on freedom are good regardless of their consequences") cannot be swayed by consequentialist arguments; while a true libertarian deontologist should be loathe to offer such arguments at all. A libertarian "movement" based on deontologism is, accordingly, a contradiction in terms--a movement that can't move! George Selgin ========================================================================== >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 13:18:32 -0800 >From: jmlib (jmlib) >To: libprofs >Subject: Re: ethical foundation [Forwarded from Jan Narveson:] >From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) In my book, Moral Matters, I explain (as I think it is right to put it) why the familiar philosophical dichotomy of "consequentialism" vs. "deontology" is rubbish. There is only one sensible approach to the foundations of morality. Reason is individual: each person has his or her own interests, values, desires, vision of the good. Rationality consists in organizing one's actions in such a way as to do the best one can in terms of those interests, etc. Which interests people actually do have is, of course, an empirical matter, but it is safe to say that interests vary a great deal among people, especially at the margin. Now consider morality, which is intended to be a set of rules expectedly authoritative for all. How can there be such a thing, given that reason is individual? The answer lies in the "social contract" idea. each person, A, wants each other person to behave in ways maximally conducive to A's well-being, that is, maximally conducive to the realization of whatever A holds to be valuable; likewise, A wants others to interfere as little as possible (down to a minimum of not at all) with A's own pursuit of his various goals. But obviously his pursuit is likely to conflict at times with their pursuit. In the cases where this conflict is disadvantageous to A, A has motivation to try to avoid such conflict. But rules are voluntarily adopted (broadly speaking). So A's efforts to avoid conflict with B, if they take the form of adopting moral - that is to say, internally generated - constraints on behavior, will have to take into account the need to come up with principles acceptable to B as well. The principles mutually adopted by A and B will be those tht are to their MUTUAL advantage - NOT to "consequentialism" construed, as it usually is, as some kind of concern for the utility of the group as a whole, NOR to some inexplicable "deontology" having nothing to do with one's interests. Of course morality requires the ability to forego what is in one's immediate interest sometimes; but this is justified via a higher-level strategic consideration. Having the disposition to refrain from cheating, lying, aggression, and so on, is highly beneficial when dealing with other beings capable of the same dispositions - as most of us are. (Not all, you might say. That is true. But so what? People incapable of being trusted must be dealt with as untrustworthy. At the margin, they get killed, jailed, or otherwise marginalized. It's not as if any other moral theory can do better.) Mutual advantage, then, is the general form of morality. One's own fundamental interests are its basis. __________________________________________________________________________ Jan Narveson (Professor) Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1 (519) 888-4567-1-2780# (from touch-tone); or 885-1211, ext. 2780 (via switchboard); FAX (519) 746-3097 Home: (519) 886-1673 (answering machine) e-mail: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca ========================================================================== >From: Fred Foldvary >To: jmlib >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 14:08:26 -0500 (EST) >Cc: libprofs > A new LibProfs subscriber, Jeffrey Friedman of Critical Review, > brought up an interesting question regarding the ethical foundations > of the "libertarian" movement and philosophy: should it more properly > be based on consequentialism (freedom is good because it leads to the > most desirable results) or deontologicalism (freedom is desirable > regardless of its effects on human welfare). I brought up the > suggestion that perhaps these are not irreconcilable, that in fact > they may be two sides of the same coin (e.g., I consider freedom from > coercion as part of my welfare, and I have the impression that when > humans live in freedom they naturally tend to maximize their welfare > anyway) ... whereupon Jeffrey asked for a much more rigorous > demonstration than I am currently able to give :-). The more rigorous demonstration would be along Lockean lines. We begin with the Lockean premises of independence and equality. Locke's conclusion is that one ought not harm another (2nd Treatise), although Locke provides no derivation. This is both consequentialist (harm is a consequence) and deontological (the rule is derived independent of consequence). > He suggested > that perhaps this could be started by consistently applying Austrian > economics extensively to the real world (e.g., what ended the Depression, > what caused the postwar boom, what was the effect of the Industrial > Revolution on workers, what about the "robber barons", etc.), and > then moving on into history, sociology, anthropology, political > science, etc. That does not seem like a promising approach, since Austrian economics begins where ethics ends. Fred Foldvary Economics, CSU Hayward foldvary@pobox.com ========================================================================== >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 17:59:36 -0500 (EST) >From: Jeffrey Friedman >To: Aeon Skoble >Cc: jmlib , libprofs Aeon Skoble points out that consequentialism and deontology contradict each other. I agree. I also agree with George Selgin's contention that only consequentialist arguments are likely to be persuasive to nonlibertarians. George makes another extremely important point: namely, that "a true libertarian deontologist *should* be loath to offer" consequentialist arguments. For if freedom is intrinsically valuable (that is, regardless of its consequences), then offering arguments about its beneficial consequences would merely dupe people into accepting freedom for bad reasons. Generalizing George's point, if freedom is intrinsically valuable (and if capitalism is equivalent to freedom--something I won't dispute here), and if this value trumps any harmful consequences capitalism might have, then research into the beneficial consequences of capitalism (i.e., classical liberal social science) is essentially propaganda. Conversely, if capitalism is valuable because of its beneficial consquences, and if such consequences trump any intrinsic value freedom may have, then deontological research (i.e., a priori libertarian philosophy) is essentially propaganda. To clarify the point I very briefly made to John, it's not that pursuing Austrian research will somehow square the circle and reconcile consequentialism and deontology. Rather, my question is whether Rothbard's attempt to reconcile consequentialism and deontology in the first place has not stymied important consequentialist research, including research in Austrian economics. Here are a few obvious examples of consequentialist books that have not been written, despite the emergence of many dozens of classical liberal social scientists in the last several decades: -an Austrian book on the course and 'cure' of the Depression. Did the New Deal work? -a book--apart from Clark Nardinelli's brief book on child labor-- examining the consequences (not the causes) of the Industrial Revolution. As far as I know, Hayek's 1954 CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS, containing only very brief and impressionistic treatments of this topic, is the last word from the Austrian or even free-market camp. -a book on the Gilded Age. Libertarians have been relying, as far as I can tell, on Rothbard's appropriation of Gabriel Kolko, but Kolko has long been superseded, and in any case the myth of rapacious Robber Barons continues to be so crucial to contemporary thinking about the economy that not having a full-length treatment is a huge lacuna. -a book on the postwar boom. It is commonly thought that this phenomenon demonstrates the possibility of effective state management of the economy, or of the wonders of strong unions. -a book--even an article?--on European, and particularly Scandinavian, social democracies. -a systematic theoretical rebuttal of Keynesianism. My hypothesis is that this work, and other work like it, has not been done at least in part because classical liberal social scientists tend to be convinced that laissez-faire capitalism is morally right on deontological grounds, so there is no real need to produce research of this sort. Regardless of the results of such research, capitalism is vindicated a priori. So what takes on urgency is (a) policy research designed to implement laissez faire in various fields (which we know, prior to the research, is intrinsically good); and (b) methodological research, defending Austrian-school views against people who consider Austrians not to be real economists, and therefore not to be worth hiring in economics departments. My intention in floating this hypothesis is not to impugn the intentions or abilities of classical liberal social scientists. It is to try to explain why so little memorable work of a fundamental sort--work like Rothbard's AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION--has been produced over the last 30 years, even though the number of people who might have produced it has been multiplied manyfold. The work c.l. social scientists *have* done is great, brilliant stuff; but it seems, in many cases, to be peripheral to the kinds of worries that make people reject libertarian conclusions. (Here I disagree with Aeon. Very few people I've ever encountered--outside of philosophy and political science/theory departments--think the problem with capitalism is philosophical rather than that it has caused depressions, the immiseration of workers, monopolies, etc.) My question, and my tentative answer to it, germinated over the 10 years in which I have tried to find people who could write on such topics for CRITICAL REVIEW. But they only crystallized two weeks ago, when someone at a libertarian scholarly organization asked me for a list of pressing classical liberal research needs. As I began drawing up the list, it seemed endless, and for the first time I noticed the remarkable fact that the key books about the beneficial consequences of capitalism, such as those of Rothbard and Hayek mentioned above, all appeared *before* classical liberal scholars began to proliferate in the 1970s. As for neo-Aristotelianism, I don't see how it is germane. It seems to presuppose that freedom is good, and tells us about its characterological preconditions. My question concerns the basis for the belief that freedom-cum-capitalism is a good thing to begin with. Similarly, Narveson's contractarianism is unresponsive. He effectively presupposes, like deontologists, the intrinsic value of individual freedom-cum-private property rights--despite his attempt to transcend the deontological-consequentialist dichotomy--when he equates people's well-being with whatever they happen to desire. Aren't there some desires whose satisfaction would make the desirer miserable, not happy? Of course there are. Why, then, should we go along with Narveson and view the satisfaction of such desires as being so important that it trumps possible interference with their satisfaction that would make for happiness, unless it is because we have decided a priori that the consequences of noninterference for human well-being are irrelevant? And why are the desires of murderers to be "marginalized," but the desires of capitalists and hedonists are not? Narveson's view is a reductio ad absurdum of the essentially deontological form of utilitarianism that takes individual desire-satisfaction, rather than happiness, to be the goal. This isn't the place to go into whether Narveson's form of deontology is *valid* (which we he and I have debated at length in CRITICAL REVIEW), because that question is irrelevant to my query about the deleterious effect of deontological libertarianism on consequentialist scholarship. Even if, as I hypothesize, there has been such an effect, it would not constitute an argument against the *validity* of deontology. Narveson or Foldvary may be right about the intrinsic value of individual freedom-cum-private property rights, but that is a separate topic from whether classical liberals' belief in this intrinsic value has stymied their desire to do consequentialist research. --Jeffrey Friedman, POB 205416 Yale Stn., New Haven CT 06520 ========================================================================== >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 21:37:08 EST >From: Steven Horwitz >To: Liberty Professors Jeff Friedman claims classical liberals/Austrians have never written a systematic theoretical rebuttal to Keynesianism. Not so. Might I recommend W. H. Hutt's *The Keynesian Episode*? While not without its flaws, it is certainly an attempt to do precisely what Jeff is asking and does so quite well in places. I'm in the middle of re-reading it for the first time in about 9 or 10 years and I am surprised at how on target it was and how many of the ideas in it have become part of the general Austrian/c.l. perspective in the years since it was written. Steven Horwitz Eggleston Associate Professor of Economics St. Lawrence University Canton, NY 13617 TEL (315) 379-5731 FAX (315) 379-5819 EMAIL shor@music.stlawu.edu ========================================================================== >Date: Wed, 27 Mar 1996 21:32:40 -0500 (EST) >From: address >Subject: Consequentialism >To: libprofs A question for the deontologist. There are a number of reasons which I might choose today to contract not to enter into a contract in the future. Are such contracts binding? Am I free to be forced, or must I be forced to be free? If the latter, why the restriction on my bargaining freedom? If the former, may I emigrate (with my time machine) to the ancien regime (much better furniture)? A related question. If I am forced to be free to permit me to contract however I want in the future, is there such a thing as a deontological theory of promising. I argued not in the Minnesota Law Review some years back, and would be happy to be shown to be wrong. Frank Buckley GMU Law ========================================================================== >From: "Aeon Skoble" >To: Jeffrey Friedman , libprofs >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 08:19:56 CST6CDT > (Here I disagree with Aeon. Very few people I've ever > encountered--outside of philosophy and political science/theory > departments--think the problem with capitalism is philosophical rather > than that it has caused depressions, the immiseration of workers, > monopolies, etc.) This disagreement may be due to the fact that I hang out with other philosophers and you hang out with other social scientists. I cannot speak to objections raised by your colleagues, only mine. Lefty _philosophers_ criticize libertarianism along the lines I mentioned. I will say, however, that if lefty social scientists think capitalism _causes_ monopolies, they're sloppy, and if they think capitalism _causes_ poor workers, they should visit a communist country. It seems to me that empirical attacks on libertarianism would be the easiest ones to refute. Prosperity increases in direct proportion to economic liberty. The more time-consuming attacks on libertarianism are ones that, regardless of economic consequences, argue that too much freedom is somehow bad (alienates people, promotes commercialism, makes people unsocial, etc.). These people don't care about economics, believe me. > As for neo-Aristotelianism, I don't see how it is germane. It's germane to the extent that any moral approach to defending libertarianism is, and I suggest that it is a sound approach. You mischaracterize it, I'm afraid, when you say that > It seems to presuppose that freedom is good Not at all - it presupposes that human well-being is good, then shows how individual freedom serves this goal. Best, Aeon Skoble ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 96 09:05:12 EST >From: (George Selgin) >To: jeffrey.friedman@yale.edu >Cc: libprofs In Message Wed, 27 Mar 1996 17:59:36 -0500 (EST), Jeffrey Friedman writes: >Here are a few obvious examples of consequentialist books that have not >been written, despite the emergence of many dozens of classical liberal >social scientists in the last several decades: > >-an Austrian book on the course and 'cure' of the Depression. Did the New >Deal work? There's no "Austrian" book on the New Deal--true enough. But Rothbard's examination of Hoover's proto-New Deal policies in *America's Great Depression* is a good start (forgetting the serious flaws in the theoretical chapters of that book). Also, on unemployment policy, there's Galloway and Vedder's *Put of Work.* Finally, there's Gene Smiley's excellent article in Jeff's own journal, *Critical review.* (Naturally, the more broadly one defines "Austrian," the less truth there is to Jeff's claim.) >-a book--apart from Clark Nardinelli's brief book on child labor-- >examining the consequences (not the causes) of the Industrial Revolution. >As far as I know, Hayek's 1954 CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS, containing >only very brief and impressionistic treatments of this topic, is the last >word from the Austrian or even free-market camp. Not so: there's plenty of free-market revisionist stuff on the industrial revolution. But again, if one insists on it being "Austrian" in the narrow sense meaning laden with references to Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard, or full of chest-thumping declarations about the merits of the praxeological method, a-priorism, and subjectivism, well, then nothings left on the list, precisely because the people who write that kind of chest-thumping stuff are mainly propagandists! >-a systematic theoretical rebuttal of Keynesianism. There are, of course, books by Hazlitt and Hutt (though they left plenty to be said by other non-Austrian classical liberals). >My hypothesis is that this work, and other work like it, has not been done >at least in part because classical liberal social scientists tend to be >convinced that laissez-faire capitalism is morally right on deontological >grounds, so there is no real need to produce research of this sort. True perhaps for hard-core "Austrians," but not for classical liberal scholars generally, many of whom are consequentialists. (Milton Friedman, for one.) I think that Jeff hasn't noticed something I picked up long ago: that "Austrian" has become a label for "pure" types whose very purity prevents them from doing much relevant applied economics. "Consequentialists" who have been closely involved with the Austrian school but who wish to address real-world issues soon discover that methodological purity is a mental road-block, and give it up. But then we find ourselves defined out of the school. I, for one, have never had any regrets about that. George Selgin ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 09:04:58 -0500 (EST) >From: Bill Woolsey >>From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) >In my book, Moral Matters, I explain (as I think it is right to put it) why >the familiar philosophical dichotomy of "consequentialism" vs. "deontology" >is rubbish. Can I take this as a claim that "contractualism" is supposedly a fourth category? That is there are three choices: 1. Deontology 2. Consequentialism 3. Contractualism 4. Aristotelianism I would like to add that consequentialism is a view that judges the right based on consequences, presumably for the good. This would allow for many sub-categories, including subjectivist and objectivist concepts of the good, individual and collective concepts of the good, and no doubt others. One final point. Leland Yeager reviewed Rassmussen and Den Uyl (sorry if I spelled it wrong) in Liberty and claimed that the differences between their version of Aristotelianism and his version of Utilitarianism were entirely (or perhaps it was mostly) semantic. Bill Woolsey Email: Bill.Woolsey@Citadel.edu Dept. of Business Administration Home: (803) 795-5062 The Citadel Office: (803) 953-5161 Charleston, South Carolina 29409 Fax: (803) 953-7084 U.S.A. ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 10:48:40 EST >From: Steven Horwitz >To: Liberty Professors I just wanted to second virtually all of what George Selgin had to say in response to Jeff Friedman's list of "missing" work. However, I do want to add one point about the following: >True perhaps for hard-core "Austrians," but not for classical liberal >scholars generally, many of whom are consequentialists. (Milton Friedman, >for one.) I think that Jeff hasn't noticed something I picked up long ago: >that "Austrian" has become a label for "pure" types whose very purity >prevents them from doing much relevant applied economics. >"Consequentialists" who have been closely involved with the Austrian >school but who wish to address real-world issues soon discover that >methodological purity is a mental road-block, and give it up. But then we >find ourselves defined out of the school. I, for one, have never had any >regrets about that. Perhaps this is more appropriate to the AustrianEcon list, but then again maybe it isn't. However... I am less willing than George to give up on the word "Austrian" and hand it over to those who are overly concerned about methodological purity and the like, and who are all too willing to "define out" those who don't stick to the supposed party line. I see no reasons to reject a broader conception of Austrian economics that includes much of the work George is referring to and that is open enough to be clear in its consequentialism. After all, the folks who "founded" and developed Austrian economics for most of this century and the one before were, in fact, consequentialists. I would argue that it is only in the Rothbardian variant of Austrian economics that one sees aprioristic claims about the desirability of the market. If that branch of Austrian economics *defines* Austrian economics then, like George, I'm glad to be defined out of it. I just deny the premise: there's a helluva lot more to Austrian economics, understood broadly, and I'm just unwilling to give up on the name and the proud, and consequentialist, tradition that it reflects. Steven Horwitz Eggleston Associate Professor of Economics St. Lawrence University Canton, NY 13617 TEL (315) 379-5731 FAX (315) 379-5819 EMAIL shor@music.stlawu.edu ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 08:54:21 -0800 (PST) >From: Robert Higgs >To: Jeffrey Friedman >Cc: Aeon Skoble , jmlib , libprofs Jeff, With regard to your list of the books that have not been written by researchers with a classical liberal perspective, there is an immense literature on all the topics you mention. I know because I have written a fair amount of it myself, including a (short, so perhaps it doesn't count) book on the U.S. economy, 1865-1914, well-noticed articles on the end of the Great Depression (supposedly in WWII, but not really until the war ended), a book reinterpreting the reletive power of racism and the market in the postbellum South, and so forth--as we speak a paper I just wrote on how the New Deal prolonged the depression is circulating and will be presented at the Public Choice Society meetings in a couple weeks. I have spent more than 25 years doing and publishing the sort of work you list. And not just me but dozens of others, including more than a half dozen people I trained at the U. of Wash--Bob McGuire, Lee Alston, John Wallis, Yuzo Murayama, Price Fishback, and Charlotte Twight--all of whom have published extensively exactly the sort of work you seem to be searching for. Perhaps the problem is that libertarians have not delved into the literature of economic history, which has been a flourishing field of research in the past 40 years. Incidentally, my dear friend Murray Rothbard apparently ignored most of this literature, I think because he peremptorily dismissed work that looked like cliometrics on methodological grounds. In this I believe he denied himself access to a great deal of valuable information. Cheers, and happy reading. Bob ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 96 10:38:30 PST >From: hanson@dosh.hum.caltech.edu (Robin Hanson) >To: libprofs "Aeon Skoble" writes: >> Very few people I've ever encountered--outside of philosophy and >>political science/theory departments--think the problem with >>capitalism is philosophical rather than that it has caused >>depressions, the immiseration of workers, monopolies, etc.) > >This disagreement may be due to the fact that I hang out with other >philosophers and you hang out with other social scientists. I cannot >speak to objections raised by your colleagues, only mine. Lefty >_philosophers_ criticize libertarianism along the lines I mentioned. >I will say, however, that if lefty social scientists think capitalism >_causes_ monopolies, they're sloppy, and if they think capitalism >_causes_ poor workers, they should visit a communist country. It >seems to me that empirical attacks on libertarianism would be the >easiest ones to refute. Prosperity increases in direct proportion to >economic liberty. The more time-consuming attacks on libertarianism >are ones that, regardless of economic consequences, argue that too >much freedom is somehow bad (alienates people, promotes >commercialism, makes people unsocial, etc.). These people don't care >about economics, believe me. Issues of alienation, commercialism, unsocial folks, etc. are, in my view, economic questions, and can in principle be addressed using the tools of professional economists. Perhaps these academic conversations should become more integrated. I wonder, do these philosophers believe that these workers expect that they would be happier if they moved somewhere with a more socialist economy? If so, why don't we see more internally-socialist enclaves starting up? I know the long reach of the state makes it hard to start up truely free enclaves, but does it also prevent socialist enclaves? Or would the supposed externality of other folks in the world trading stuff have such a long reach so as to bother folks in a socialist enclave so much as to not be worth it? Robin Hanson hanson@hss.caltech.edu http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~hanson/ ========================================================================== >From: "Aeon Skoble" >To: hanson@dosh.hum.caltech.edu (Robin Hanson), libprofs >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 13:58:38 CST6CDT > Issues of alienation, commercialism, unsocial folks, etc. are, in my > view, economic questions, and can in principle be addressed using the > tools of professional economists. Perhaps, but their moralistic proponents wouldn't accept that. (I'm agnostic myself on that.) So it remains necessary, at least from the point of view of winning friends and influencing people, to have a moral defense of libertarianism. > Perhaps these academic conversations should become more integrated. No doubt. Best, Aeon Skoble ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 15:27:12 EST >From: Steven Horwitz >To: Liberty Professors >Subject: J. Friedman's argument Just a couple of points I wanted to add to Jeff Friedman's argument: 1) My disagreement over the details of what has and has not been done on "consequentialist" research in no way was meant to deny the need for and importance of such research. There's plenty more that needs to be done. 2) Most of Jeff's concern was about why certain books hadn't been written. And, in fact, most of the topics he listed would require book-length treatments. It's important to understand that the discipli- nary incentives in economics are extremely anti-book. In general, at least at good schools, books get you nowhere, if that. Articles at refereed journals are much more highly prized, particularly those which speak to other specialists. Writing books on the topics Jeff mentioned which would reach the audience he is concerned with (other intellectuals skeptical of capitalism) will do you no good within the discipline. Of course that only raises the question of whether advancing in the discipline is more important than investigations of important subjects aimed at the general intellectual public. It is surely true that libertarianism could use some more contributions of that type (Bob Higgs' work noted as an exception). However, to expect them to come from economists who are concerned with disciplinary advancement is probably in vain. Steven Horwitz Eggleston Associate Professor of Economics St. Lawrence University Canton, NY 13617 TEL (315) 379-5731 FAX (315) 379-5819 EMAIL shor@music.stlawu.edu ========================================================================== >From: "Aeon Skoble" >To: libprofs, libprofs >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 15:47:22 CST6CDT >Subject: Re: ethical foundation > One final point. Leland Yeager reviewed Rassmussen and Den Uyl (sorry > if I spelled it wrong) in Liberty and claimed that the differences between > their version of Aristotelianism and his version of Utilitarianism were > entirely (or perhaps it was mostly) semantic. That's not quite right, though. It's easy to characterize utilitarianism as "doing what's the best thing," and then saying that virtually anything is indistinguishable from utilitarianism, because the goal is still to do what's best. E.g., say I propose a theory of morality based on duty. So I'm acting morally when I act out of a sense of duty. But why act morally? Beacuse that's the best thing to do. Ah, so you're a utilitarian! But this is silly. Obviously, any theory has built into it an implict suggestion that you ought to the best thing. So we can't (other than vacuously) define utilitarianism this way. Utilitarianism is not just "doing the best thing" it's a theory which stresses, first of all, that moral value may only be found in actions, furthermore that the moral value of actions may only be determined on the basis of outcomes, and furthermore that the only morally relevant outcome is the greatest good for the greatest number. But once we posit a _right_, we have abandoned utilitarianism, because it's easy to think of cases where it's more uitile to violate an alleged right (e.g., censoring offensive speech). Mill attempts to reconcile his father's devotion to utilitarianism with his own intuitions about justice and fairness (procedural, not consequentialist, concerns) by coming up with what we now call rule-utilitarianism, but the utilitarian part of it gets so lost as to hardly be discernable. It reads more like deontology (a person's liberty is _inviolable), albeit a deontology generated by an Aristotelian conception of human well-being, rationality, etc. (When the next issue of _Vera Lex_ come out, see my review of Rasmussen and Den Uyl's book.) Aeon Skoble ========================================================================== >Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 16:31:51 -0500 >To: libprofs, WOOLSEYW@citadel.edu >From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) >>From: Bill Woolsey >>Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 09:04:58 -0500 (EST) > >>>From: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca (Jan Narveson) > >>In my book, Moral Matters, I explain (as I think it is right to put it) why >>the familiar philosophical dichotomy of "consequentialism" vs. "deontology" >>is rubbish. > > Can I take this as a claim that "contractualism" is supposedly a fourth >category? That is there are three choices: > >1. Deontology >2. Consequentialism >3. Contractualism >4. Aristotelianism > > I would like to add that consequentialism is a view that judges the >right based on consequences, presumably for the good. This would allow for >many sub-categories, including subjectivist and objectivist concepts of the >good, individual and collective concepts of the good, and no doubt others. > One final point. Leland Yeager reviewed Rassmussen and Den Uyl (sorry >if I spelled it wrong) in Liberty and claimed that the differences between >their version of Aristotelianism and his version of Utilitarianism were >entirely (or perhaps it was mostly) semantic. > >Bill Woolsey Email: Bill.Woolsey@Citadel.edu >Dept. of Business Administration Home: (803) 795-5062 >The Citadel Office: (803) 953-5161 >Charleston, South Carolina 29409 Fax: (803) 953-7084 >U.S.A. The list, however, is ill-assorted: it's an apples and oranges list. Consequentialism and deontology, as usually defined (which is an overstatement, because they tend to be NOT defined), aren't actually views about the *foundations* of morals at all. Is "Aristetelianism"? Not directly; it is a view about *ethics*, which is a much wider subject than morals. Insofar as it implies any view about the foundations of morality, it either implies a rather dumb version of egoism or, as usual, it collapses into the contractarian view. Kant is widely thought to be "deontological", but is actually contractarian also. And you omit Intuitionist, which may or may not be thought of as a "foundational" view, though I'd be inclined to say that it is antifoundationalist. Sorry to be so brisk; I'm in the midst of another project that can't wait. No doubt I'll be back! __________________________________________________________________________ Jan Narveson (Professor) Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1 (519) 888-4567-1-2780# (from touch-tone); or 885-1211, ext. 2780 (via switchboard); FAX (519) 746-3097 Home: (519) 886-1673 (answering machine) e-mail: jnarveso@watarts.UWaterloo.ca ==========================================================================