Position Paper #5 (Until revised as required by new evidence.)
 8-15-94 
Looking at Language
(g.s. according to eh)

Position papers #1-4 promote readers' discovering for themselves 
how the world fits together (#1), without metaphysics (#2), by 
agreement between observers (#3), who share consciousness which we 
might understand as an emergent property of sufficiently complex 
nervous systems. (#4).

We inheret DNA from our parents as a blueprint.  That gets modified 
by the accidents of circumstance.  For each of us, of our contact 
with language began so long ago that none of us can remember our 
first words.  Our mothers might, but as individuals most of us 
don't.  Human beings usually begin talking between the ages of one 
and two years of age, well before they can hope to have any 
understanding of what speaking, words, and language entail.   Given 
a knowledge of the language which we have acquired over a number of 
years, we get to the problem of how did we acquire it?  How do we 
know what any word  means?  Language represents a social activity.  
We know of no individuals raised in isolation who speak a language.  
We learn language by immersion in it.  Words surround us and we 
learn by imitation.  Infants deprived of language stimulation during 
the first few years of life never achieve verbal proficiency.   I 
propose to consider language an aspect of social behavior.   

I read somewhere (and I cannot locate the source) an anecdote about 
one of the primary foibles attendant to using language.  [I would 
appreciate it if someone would tell me where to find it.]  A person, 
perhaps curious about language asks: 
"If we decide to call a dog's tail 'a leg', will a dog have five legs?" 
The rejoinder came back: 
"No, but we can still call a dog's tail, 'a leg.'"

This dialog underscores the distinction between "words" and 
on-going material processes or "whatever-goes-on."  The word "leg" 
has no necessary connection to any material object.  We make 
arbitrary connections between the word "leg" and any number of 
material structures or immaterial allusions.  In addition to the 
biological appendage, "leg", we label a piano support "a leg", and 
the distance between two points of a journey "a leg."  From the 
preceeding considerations, no word has a necessary meaning, except 
that which we choose to give it, for social purposes.

Before going on with this approach, we need to consider on-going 
processes (things or objects of perception) as totally different 
from language use (words and other symbols).  We cannot categorize 
on-going processes, objects and events as either verbal or social. 
We have every reason to infer that processes go on despite
our apprehension or appreciation of them.  It seems reasonable to 
infer that before Harvey discovered blood circulation, hearts 
pumped.  Before the conjecture of plate tectonic theory, continents 
moved.  This paper deals with aspects of communication and cannot
alter on-going physical processes.  So if someone threatens physical 
violence as the result of your attempts to communicate, I suggest 
that words will not act as a mechanical or material shield.

We symbolize as a social activity.  Through the use of language, we 
communicate. "Please pass the salt."  If the person addressed, hears 
and understands the language, he or she may respond appropriately.  
If the person addressed reaches for a knife or a large blunt 
instrument, your attempt to communicate has gone awry.  Take evasive 
action!

If the person addressed does hand you a container of salt, you have 
at least that evidence to demonstrate that two people can 
communicate, perhaps without rancor or deceit.  What conditions made 
that possible?

1. Both participants have knowledge of the language. 
2. Both agree to the verbal structures used. 
3. Both agree about the correspondence between the personal 
   neural representations (PNR's or perceptions) and the labels 
   used to symbolize them.

At this juncture we seek only to establish the necessary ground work 
for communication. Verbal deception introduces so many variables as 
to obscure the groundwork about the basis of communication. We 
cannot consider them here.

The Least Common Agreement about Perception or LCAP

In order to understand the word "salt" we have to have some 
experience related to the word, since words and process-events have 
no necessary relationship.  Salt comes in many forms, but most 
commonly, we use the word salt to symbolize a granular form of NaCl 
found in most households.  We perceive (as Personal Neural 
Representations or PNR's) the process-event and tag it with the 
label used by the other speakers in the household. [Language 
acquisition has some of the elements of hypnosis, in that the new 
language acquirer has to accept the suggestion of the older speaker 
in order to communicate.]  We may taste the material to test, 
reinforce, or justify our label.  Note that a blind person who 
cannot see salt, must feel it and then taste it to identify the PNR 
as salt and apply the appropriate tag to this familiar object of 
experience.  

Language about process-events (as objects of perception) requires a 
Least Common Agreement about Perception (LCAP) between speakers.  
Without that, language based transactions fall victim to dissent.  
With a knowledge of the language and some LCAP we satisfy the 
requirements for a language based transaction.  

An Example:
 A:  "There is a deer up on the hill."
 B:      "I can't see it.
 A:  "It stopped moving, just left of that tree with the dead branch."
 B:      "I still can't see it."

B cannot see the deer and therefore cannot share with A an LCA of 
Perception.  B disagrees and may reasonably deny the presence of a 
deer.  Now the deer moves.

 B:      "Oh, now I see it.  It's a doe and now I can see a fawn 
          too."

This example illustrates communication about the kinds of things we 
perceive.  Questions of material observation take many 
forms.  We can often resolve disagreements about material objects 
through an LCAP.  We use language to achieve LCAP's. Do you 
see what I see? Not necessarily, but we can work to establish a 
Least Common Agreement of Perception.  This forms the foundation of 
social communication. We perceive, label and proceed to talk.

The Least Common Agreement about a Contract

We can conjecture that at one time, human social groups might have 
operated like those of lions or great apes.  In these social groups,
might makes right.  With the advent of language, people living in a 
social context began to develop rules about conduct.  The Code of 
Hammurapi represents one of the oldest recorded legal codes.  We 
still use physical means when communications about contracts fail.  
When we have reached a broad consensus LCAP, we can use that as the 
foundation for contract negotiations.  

A contract represents an agreement involving the exchange of goods 
and services between the communicating parties.  When we define 
words for the purposes of a particular discussion, we agree to a 
contract about word usage.  Often, contracts entail obligations not 
readily assessed or addressed at the time of assent.  That happens 
because no one can predict the future with certainty.  The best 
chance for negotiating a successful contract arises when the 
contracting parties have reached broad concensus LCAP.  Contractors 
assume that the future will reflect the past.  They have no other 
choice. Marriage represents one form of such an assumptive 
contract.  Students tacitly contract to fulfill the requirements of 
the course, little realizing that some professors will ask for the 
world. [Anything less may represent a waste of time and effort of 
both.]  

Most employees contract to give of their time and effort under the 
direction of the employer in exchange for goods, like a paycheck.  
That situation changes in some emergency situations.  Armed forces 
personnel contract to give up their lives, if so ordered.  People 
who qualify for driver's licenses, agree to a social contract, to 
obey the "rules of the road."  Breaking a contract, whether marriage 
vows the rules of the road or military obligation entails physical  
sanctions. We determine individual "rights" by contract between the 
individual citizen and the hierarchy of elected representatives 
forming "the state."  The study of law involves LCA about Contracts 
or LCAC. Generalizing, a contract refers to an agreement between 
parties about an arbitrary (but specific) relationship, from 
employment (you can work for anyone who accepts your services or 
hire anyone willing to accept your offer) to human rights within the 
society.

Least Common Agreement about Belief

The study of the inferred physical universe (whatever-goes-on) fails 
to reveal in detail the exact nature of events in the past, on-going 
present changes, or those events to occur in the projected future.  
In order to arrive at some consensus about our perceptions of the 
past, contracts of various kinds and our expectations for the 
future, we assent to some ideas about which we have no evidence. We 
make inferences (both reasonable and unreasonable depending upon 
your point of view) about the past, present and future of both 
physical and reified structures.  We call these inferences beliefs.  
We put our inferences into words.  Both communication and 
miscommunication ensue.  In order to form a community, those who 
symbolize must find some degree of commonality in their LCAP's, 
LCAC's, and LCAB's.

Where Least Common Agreements Count
 
You cannot expect to communicate with a far-sighted older person 
(without his glasses) about the want ads in the daily paper. I know, 
I can't read them without my glasses. We cannot arrive at a suitable 
LCAP.  The opposite condition is called near-sightedness or myopia.  
If you have or develop myopia, you cannot read road signs without 
corrective lenses. Some interactions in society depend upon everyone 
following the rules of the road. If you vision changes markedly you 
may not drive without the corrective lenses required to bring your 
vision up to the legally allowable standard.  If you do, that marks 
a violation of an LCAC.  That information will appear on your 
driver's license. You may not disregard road signs because you 
because you believe that others will get out of your way.  To do so 
violates the basic LCAB.  Motorists and pedestrians who use the 
roads _don't believe_ anyone should disregard road signs and present 
a hazard to the safety of others, including themselves.  Should you 
violate any of these minimum agreements, you'll have a lot of 
explaining to do, fines to pay, and by due process of law in this 
society, you may find yourself incarcerated. That too will have to 
come out in words in a social context. 

-------------------------

Honest Disagreements About Perception

We have already discussed the effects of failing to find an LCAP.  
Each person must have an individual point of view, because no two 
people have identical nervous systems or can access the same data. 
We do have sufficiently similar nervous systems to allow us to reach 
agreement about some set of perceptual stimuli. Even the person who 
can no longer hear chirping crickets can assent to squiggles on an 
oscilloscope when we correlate the squiggles with the chirping 
cricket they can no longer hear. Those who fail to sense temperature 
or pain as the result of bodily damage, will have severe problems 
making their way in the world. We assume sufficient sensitivity to 
some environmental stimuli in order to communicate at all. That 
sufficient sensitivity forms the foundation for communication. 
Without it, we live in profound isolation, socially and physically.

You don't have to see what I see, but you have to see enough of what 
I see to avoid categorization as "legally blind." For the blind 
person, unless we can achieve communication about what what the 
sighted see through some other sensory channel, we cannot 
communicate about visual stimuli. We can have an honest disagreement 
about red roses with a blind person, the sound of crickets with a 
deaf person, etc.

Honest Disagreements About Contracts

Contracts come in a wide variety of forms, but ultimately they 
depend upon one standard. Those who form them agree to abide by the 
decision of the appropriate social spokesperson when a disagreement 
arises. A brief glance at the calendar of any court leaves no 
uncertainty about who judges claims of contract violation. Formal 
contracts require formal adjudication. Judges deny that honest 
disagreements about contracts exist. If an honest disagreement 
surfaces, a judge will declare the contract null and void because 
the parties to the supposed agreement, never reached accord.

Tacit social contracts abound and those in a position to judge the 
merits of the case do so for themselves. The penalty for breaking a 
tacit contract is ostracism. The person who agrees not to tell and 
does, soon finds no one willing to discuss secrets. The hypocrite 
who breaks no law, soon faces first specific and then general social 
ostracism. 

It seems that we cannot have honest disagreements about contracts. 
This underscores the arbitrariness of words. They lack the 
substantial measurable qualities of matter.

Honest Disagreements About Beliefs

>From the foregoing it appears that we can agree about perceptions, 
at some level, as a function of individual neural apparatus. We 
either achieve some LCAP's or we fail to communicate.

Similarly, we can agree about contracts, at some level, as a 
function of arbitrary consent. I'll deliver X goods to you providing 
you pay me Y on a date Z. We agree to an arbitrary time keeping 
system as a function of society. We agree about what constitutes X 
goods, and we agree about monetary units Y. They in turn, refer to 
perceptions put into arbitrary (but agreed upon) words.

Can we have agreements about beliefs? Sure! Can we have honest 
disagreements about beliefs? That question requires some discussion. 
A belief differs from a perception in that it does not necessarily 
involve an LCAP. A belief differs from a contract in that it does 
not require an LCAC. Beliefs come in two types, knowledge and faith 
or conjecture.

To disseminate a belief someone must put it in the form of a 
proposition. [I cannot disagree with something someone believes if I 
never find out what that person believes.] Beliefs involve 
inferences. We know we have disagreements about belief. The question 
remains, can we have honest disagreements about belief?

Let's start out with something simple. Mr. A says,               
             "A clock is an ordered structure."

When pressed to give evidence for his statement, Mr. A will point to 
the gears, springs, shafts and wheels as evidence of the order in 
the clock. Now I take the clock apart carefully and label each 
piece, the balance staff, the escapement wheel and ratchet, the main 
spring, etc., I will not find any component of the clock we call 
"order."  I tell Mr. A I have no part left over corresponding to 
"order."

"No, no, you have it all wrong", Mr. A protests. 
"Don't you see, "order" refers to the way the pieces fit together?"  

I reply, "Of course Mr. A.  As you can see, I have taken the clock 
apart so that the pieces no longer fit together.  You say that the 
clock is an ordered structure, but we have no order in evidence. 
I'll be lucky to put the clock back together again. How can you say 
that the clock is an ordered structure?"

-----------------

Korzybski said (in effect) the content of knowledge is order, 
structure and relation. Knowledge does not refer to simple sensory 
perception nor does it refer to arbitrary contracts. Knowledge 
refers to inferences about perceptions and arbitrary contracts. 
Order refers to an abstraction inferred from perception. Knowledge 
refers to inferences based on reproducible material evidence. 
Let's look at what we "know" about "seeing."

"Seeing is believing - nothing can be more convincing than the world 
picture we see all around us.  Yet the visual image does not exist 
anywhere in our eyes or brains as an actual display of a picture. 
Vision is the product of a myriad of firing neurons each with a 
specialized sensitivity: color, motion, edges, dim or bright light, 
etc.  The entire picture is put together by our brain and we say 
that we see, but nowhere in that brain is there a display of a 
picture as there is on the film of a camera. If we can be as 
convinced as we are by what we see, and this `just neuronal 
interaction', then the equally compelling awareness or consciousness 
may also be a synthesis produced by neuronal interaction." [BASIS, 
Dec 94, from his article on Francis Watson's book, The Astonishing 
Hypothesis.]

Vision refers to a complex construct of neuronal activity, a fairly 
accurate map of matter and visible light (energy) interactions. 
Vision represents a kind of neural abstraction of sensory data. We 
can infer that order, structure and relation refer to higher level 
neural abstractions about sensory data. Order refers to a construct 
of the brain, a specific kind of map of whatever-goes-on. Put more 
bluntly, you cannot find order in matter-energy, any more than you 
can find pictures in the brain. We have some mistaken ideas about 
order, structure and relation as well. Knowledge consists of 
propositions about the order, structure and relationships of 
matter-energy which we can test. To qualify as "knowledge" the 
propositions must not yet have proven "false" when subjected to 
tests under controlled conditions.

Knowledge consists of propositions of belief, when we attempt to 
apply specific propositions to the future. I believe that the sun 
will appear on the eastern horizon tomorrow morning. The arbitrary 
social decisions about time keeping and direction imply contracts. 
We can agree on the time and the location, but not the predicted 
action. At the base of such predictions lies the assumed "uniformity 
of nature." It also entails the controlled conditions clause, "all 
other things being equal." These factors control the scope of 
scientific beliefs or beliefs based on knowledge.

Faith and conjecture refer to propositions about order, structure 
and relation which we either cannot or have not tested. 

Now can we have honest disagreements about beliefs? We can and we 
do, but they rarely have anything to do with knowledge. We contest 
claims about faith and conjecture. I cannot imagine 
a test for "beauty", "honor" or "quality."  We can certainly equate 
the quality of a piece of muslin with the thread count, but does the 
quality of a brand of ice cream relate to its thread count?

[this is still not finished.  comments?]